This GigaOm Research Reprint Expires September 23, 2027
September 8, 2026

GigaOm Radar: Zero Trust Network Access v5

Chris Ray

Analyst at GigaOm

1.
Market Context

1. Market Context

Zero trust network access (ZTNA) has moved from a debated model to a purchase decision. Every product in this Radar brokers access one application at a time, on identity and device posture, instead of putting the user on the network. Nearly all are sold as the replacement for the same thing: the remote-access VPN and the flat internal network behind it. What has changed is who is selling it. The field arrives from every direction—security service edge and single-vendor SASE platforms, an identity incumbent, network access control and application-delivery lineages, VPN-era products rebuilt for cloud management, browser-isolation architectures, and a small band of software-defined-perimeter purists for whom the access architecture is the entire product.

Two pressures now organize the market. The first is platform absorption: for most of this field, ZTNA is a function of a larger converged offering rather than a product, and the capability a buyer actually receives is scattered across named, separately licensed modules. The second is architectural settlement: the outbound-only connector, the brokered session, and continuous rather than login-time evaluation have become the reference design, so the field now differentiates on how completely and how verifiably each vendor implements it. The six themes below capture where these pressures are separating the field.

The Platform Is the Purchase

Across most of this roster, the access product cannot be evaluated alone, because it is not sold alone. The strongest capabilities frequently sit in named adjacent SKUs rather than the core subscription. These separately licensed products cover privileged remote access with credential vaulting and session recording, enterprise browsers, industrial gateways and rugged appliances, risk-scoring services, remote browser isolation, and data-loss-prevention engines.The converged platforms make a genuine architectural argument for this, with one client, one inspection pass, and one policy plane spanning private, web, and SaaS traffic. The best implementations document real object sharing rather than console adjacency. The pure-play minority makes the opposite argument: a self-contained access architecture with no platform tax, at the cost of sourcing web, cloud, and data security elsewhere.

What this means for buyers: Price the SKU chain, not the demo. For every capability that matters to your evaluation, establish in writing which license carries it—the capsules in this report name these dependencies vendor by vendor. Platform buyers already committed to the surrounding suite inherit strong economics; buyers evaluating the access function alone should assume the demo showed the platform.

The Outbound-Only Connector Is the Settled Architecture

The market has converged on a deployment pattern: a lightweight connector deployed beside private applications, dialing outbound to a broker, with nothing at the customer site accepting an inbound connection. The strongest implementations make that connector available across an extensive set of form factors, including hypervisor images, cloud marketplace instances, container images, and orchestration charts. They also explicitly document egress-only network requirements. Deviation from this pattern is now the marked case: a handful of products still terminate client connections on an inbound-facing gateway or a customer-hosted server with a public address, and the capsules treat that as an architectural finding rather than a stylistic one. At the frontier sit the single-packet-authorization designs, where infrastructure refuses to answer unauthenticated traffic at all, and the reverse-proxy designs, where public hostnames answering before authentication is inherent to the model.

What this means for buyers: Make the exposure question a gating question: what listens, what answers before authentication, and what inbound firewall rules does the deployment actually require? The answers separate architecturally settled products from products still carrying their lineage, and they are verifiable from documentation before any proof of concept begins.

From Login Gate to Continuous Adjudication

The field divides sharply when trust is re-evaluated. At the front, access decisions are made per request or per transaction—every retrieval re-adjudicated, posture changes pushed over persistent channels that re-verify established sessions, and identity events such as account disablement or a risk-score change interrupting in-flight sessions rather than waiting for a token to expire. The middle of the field re-checks posture on a timer measured in minutes, which is genuine but bounded: the interval is the exposure window. At the back, posture is a gate evaluated at connection time only, and an established session outlives the conditions that authorized it. The differences are documented, specific, and material to what “zero trust” means in each product.

What this means for buyers: Ask each vendor for the trigger list. Establish precisely which events, such as posture changes, identity disablement, risk elevation, or administrator action, terminate or downgrade an established session, and how quickly that happens. A product that can only answer with a re-authentication interval is describing a shorter VPN session, not continuous evaluation.

The Unmanaged World: Contractors, BYOD, and OT

The populations that cannot run an agent are where ZTNA implementations diverge most. Browser-delivered access to web applications is broadly available. The harder capability is rendering RDP, SSH, and VNC sessions in a browser with per-application controls for clipboard use, uploads, downloads, watermarking, and recording. Only part of the field delivers this capability completely, while several products deliberately offer no clientless path at all.

Third-party governance shows the same spread: expiring grants, approval workflows, credential injection that keeps the target credential out of the contractor’s hands, and session recording at the front; agent-required onboarding with no bounded grant duration at the back. Operational technology extends the same question to devices that will never run software. Credible industrial offerings are relatively few and typically separately licensed. They include rugged form factors, industrial protocol awareness, and gateway-mediated sessions with approval windows.

What this means for buyers: Inventory the users and devices your agent will never reach—contractors, auditors, BYOD, kiosks, and controllers on a plant floor—before shortlisting. Several otherwise strong products exclude these groups by design. Then test the controls, not the checkbox: a browser-rendered session without clipboard, content, and recording governance moves the data-exfiltration problem rather than solving it.

Automation Decides Operability at Scale

The widest operational gap in this field is programmability. At one end sit versioned APIs with published OpenAPI specifications, vendor-maintained infrastructure-as-code providers covering the core policy objects, discovery pipelines that mine live traffic into reviewable application candidates with guided promotion, and migration tooling with staged-cutover and log-only enforcement modes. At the other end sit products, including some with otherwise credible security architecture, that publish no API, no command-line interface, and no provider at all. As a result, every application, policy, and enrollment is a console action performed one object at a time. In between, several platforms publish broad APIs that simply do not cover the private-access objects, which is easy to miss in an evaluation and expensive to discover afterward.

What this means for buyers: Require the artifacts, not the claim: the API reference that names the access objects, the provider in a public registry, the discovery report a proof of concept can generate. An access product that cannot be automated becomes a ticket queue at enterprise scale, and the migration itself—hundreds of applications, thousands of grants—is the first workload that will test it.

The Emerging Frontier Is Nearly Empty, and That Is the Signal

The two newest questions in this evaluation drew the weakest field-wide results, and both will decide the next cycle’s separation. Post-quantum cryptography is the lowest-scoring criterion on this Radar: a small number of products ship post-quantum key agreement on the access path itself—in one case on both the client and clientless legs, in another enabled by default across tunnel segments—while much of the field either publishes nothing or, more tellingly, ships post-quantum material elsewhere in the portfolio that the access product’s own documentation does not claim. Agentic AI workloads are the second frontier: first-class non-human principals with scoped, expiring, revocable credentials, workload identity federation, and registries governing agent-to-tool traffic exist at the front of the field, while much of the roster still routes automation through machine certificates or nothing at all.

What this means for buyers: Both criteria are roadmap diligence today and requirements tomorrow. Access tunnels carry credentials and long-lived secrets, which makes harvest-now-decrypt-later a live concern for regulated buyers; get each vendor’s post-quantum position on the access path in writing. And if AI agents will traverse private applications in your environment, ask now what principal they present—a product that can only lend an agent a human’s identity cannot answer the audit question that follows.

2.
Radar Graphic

2. Radar Graphic

Inline Image

Figure 1. GigaOm Radar for Zero Trust Network Access.

Notable Patterns

Zero trust network access is foundation-building by nature. It stands between a user and an application that must never be reachable directly, so per-application authorization, deny-by-default with no inbound listener, posture checked at connection time and a logged decision are entry requirements rather than differentiators. Foundation Builders is where that settled stack is the entire proposition, expressed as continuity with an installed estate of routers, gateways and ruggedized endpoints, and accreditation and resilience as the differentiators. Where nothing else is emphasized, the release notes are bug fixes.

Agile Optimizers holds the broadest concentration of effort, all of it directed at removing the cost of adoption. Enforcement moves into firewalls the customer already owns; the endpoint client disappears in favour of clientless browser access; connectors ship as free open-source containers; entitlement arrives inside an identity licence already paid for; delivery moves to a provider billing monthly. The wager is that the addressable market is far larger than the set of organizations that could previously staff a deployment.

Enduring Innovators is the counter-bet: access as durable architecture rather than a lighter footprint. Operated global backbones, sovereign and self-hostable fabrics, enforcement fused into the switching fabric itself, unified policy planes intended to collapse the remote-access, network-admission and desktop-virtualization estates.

Disruptive Pioneers, the smallest group, changed a premise rather than improving one: connectivity embedded inside the application itself, no broker in the data path, the browser as the boundary, identity issued to workloads rather than to people. The wager is that brokering is transitional.

3.
Tech Buying Triad

3. Tech Buying Triad

The quadrant descriptions and decision framework orient buyers to read this Radar from the enterprise procurement seat. The Radar plots solutions on two axes—Operational Focus ←→ Strategic Focus and Stability-Centered ↑↓ Evolution-Centered—so placement signals both what outcome a product is meant to deliver and how it approaches change. Decision responsibility is mapped to the Tech Buying Triad: the CIO owns Brown Money tradeoffs, the CTO owns Green Money tradeoffs, and the CISO owns GRCS tradeoffs; Emerging Technology inputs are treated as consulted advice across the Triad. This framework is the neutral lens the rest of the report uses to explain vendor capabilities and buyer implications.

Role

Bucket

What the bucket means

Responsibilities in the procurement

CIO

Brown Money

Operational and infrastructure value: capabilities tied to operational reliability, cost containment and table-stakes function.

Session Reliability and Failover, Identity Provider Integration Depth, Endpoint Agent Manageability, Access Troubleshooting and Diagnostics, OT and Non-Standard Endpoint Coverage, Multi-Tenant and Distributed Org Management, VPN Migration Tooling, Access Provisioning Automation Depth.

CTO

Green Money

Innovation and growth value: capabilities tied to revenue generation, growth and competitive differentiation.

Automation and Orchestration API, Single Packet Authorization, SSE/SASE Platform Integration, Application Discovery and Onboarding, Clientless Access Architecture, Policy Engine Architecture, Connector and Relay Architecture.

CISO

GRCS

Governance, risk, compliance and security: the controls required to operate the technology safely and within policy.

Service Resilience and Availability, Third-Party and Contractor Access Governance, Zero Trust Architecture Integrity, Data Residency and Sovereignty Controls, Supply Chain and Infrastructure Security, Continuous Session Risk Evaluation, Access Audit Trail and Forensics, Regulatory Compliance Mapping.

All three

Emerging Technology

Forward-looking capabilities that signal where the market is moving; not owned by any single role.

Input on Unified ZTNA and SSE Convergence, Quantum-Resistant Cryptography, Universal ZTNA for OT/IoT, AI-Driven Policy Automation, and ZTNA for Agentic AI Workloads, to inform trade-offs across Brown Money, Green Money and GRCS.

Quadrants

Enduring Innovators are Strategic + Stability. These are long-horizon strategic bets—vendors whose value compounds over a decade rather than a quarter, often through deep architectural decisions that are expensive to reverse. The buyer in this quadrant accepts a long time-to-value and slow visible change in exchange for step-change strategic outcomes when the bet pays off. In zero trust network access, the Enduring Innovators quadrant is dominated by converged platform fabrics: global point-of-presence networks carrying private, web, and SaaS traffic through one inspection path under one policy plane. The buyer here is consolidating access, inspection, and data protection onto a single strategic vendor, accepting concentration risk and a platform-shaped bill in exchange for an architecture whose value compounds across the whole traffic estate.

Disruptive Pioneers are Strategic + Evolution. These vendors are reshaping what the category even means: leading-edge technology, fast-moving roadmaps, novel primitives that did not previously exist as commercial products. The buyer accepts elevated risk, frequent change, and immature operational maturity in exchange for capability that simply was not previously available. In zero trust network access, the Disruptive Pioneers each sell an architectural thesis, such as infrastructure that refuses to listen on the network, deployments with no vendor cloud in the traffic path, and application delivery through a remotely executed browser. These are approaches the rest of the field does not offer, with enterprise scaffolding still filling in behind the architecture.

Foundation Builders are Operational + Stability. These vendors deliver the core infrastructure and systems of record that keep the business running; the load-bearing technology that other software depends on. The buyer in this quadrant values predictability, dependability, and low-risk continuity over rapid iteration. In zero trust network access, the Foundation Builders reached the category from adjacent traditions—application delivery, VPN concentrators, network access control, endpoint management, data security—and offer disciplined operations, mature diagnostics, and deployment models that answer residency and continuity questions by construction, with thinner automation and convergence stories as the characteristic trade.

Agile Optimizers are Operational + Evolution. These are the day-to-day operational systems that are actively improving through incremental iteration on a known mission. The buyer wants compounding gains on workflows that already work—better automation, better user experience, better integrations—not a wholesale platform replacement. In zero trust network access, the Agile Optimizers range from converged platforms iterating quickly on unified policy and per-request adjudication to deliberately narrow products that do one job exceptionally well; what unites them is a buyer modernizing access already in production, one increment at a time, without an architectural rebuild.

Axes

The X-axis: Operational Focus ←→ Strategic Focus describes intent of value. Solutions placed toward the Operational Focus side are bought to keep the business running: they minimize day-to-day operational risk and administrative effort on workflows the organization already depends on. Solutions toward the Strategic Focus side are bought to change the organization’s position: their value compounds through architectural commitments rather than immediate operational relief.

The Y-axis: Stability-Centered ↑↓ Evolution-Centered describes change posture. Stability-centered placements favor proven behavior, predictability, and low-risk continuity—change is the risk to be minimized. Evolution-centered placements treat change as the reward being purchased: frequent, useful iteration on a known mission, or a fast-moving roadmap that reshapes what the category covers.

Ring System (Leader Versus Challenger)

The Radar’s concentric rings communicate overall capability depth and maturity independent of quadrant.

Leader denotes vendors whose offerings combine broad feature depth, production-grade engineering, and sufficient operational documentation and ecosystem integration to be referenceable at scale.

The Challenger ring denotes solid capability with important areas of growth. They are useful in many deployments but likely to require more integration effort, operational validation, or feature road-mapping for specific enterprise requirements.

Use ring position as a procurement heuristic: inner-ring placements reduce integration and validation effort when the buyer’s requirements align with the vendor’s strengths; outer-ring placements demand more architectural validation, clearer SLAs during procurement, and potential pilot programs. Ring position does not change what quadrant a product targets. It only signals how far a given product’s implementation goes toward covering the full set of buyer requirements in this market.

Archetype Variants

Different buyer archetypes shift weight across the Tech Buying Triad’s accountability map. Regulated-industry buyers tilt toward GRCS, and the CISO’s accountabilities dominate procurement. Growth-led buyers shift toward Green Money and CTO leadership. Cost-pressured buyers elevate Brown Money and the CIO’s accountabilities. Succeeding with any selection in this category requires explicit Triad alignment up front: agree which bucket holds the tie-breaking veto, and define the acceptance tests that prove the deployment meets its governance and operational requirements before it carries production traffic.

Decision Matrix: Which Quadrant Fits Your Organization?

Use the per-quadrant profile below to self-identify the quadrant whose buyer most resembles your organization. Each quadrant lists the buyer who typically lands there: who they are, what they’re trying to do, how mature they are, how they think about risk, the speed they expect, and how they fund the work. Read the column that sounds like your team. That’s the quadrant whose vendors deserve your closest read.

Buyer profile

Foundation Builders

Agile Optimizers

Enduring Innovators

Disruptive Pioneers

Likely buyer

CIO, CFO-influenced procurement, CISO when compliance-driven.

CIO, COO, VP Engineering, Director of Operations.

CTO with risk-aware lens, CIO partnered with business strategy, Chief Strategy Officer.

CTO, Chief Digital Officer, business-unit GMs with P&L authority, founders.

Strategic intent

Cost reduction, governance, risk minimization, regulatory compliance. Buyer wants the lights to stay on.

Modernize and automate existing operations; faster cycle times; do more with the same team.

Build durable, defensible advantage; platforms that scale safely; governed innovation.

Transform business models; capture new markets; bet on emerging tech.

Organizational maturity

Established operations with mature processes; risk-averse change management; success measured by reliability and uptime.

Mature operations seeking efficiency gains without rebuilding; iterative improvers.

Mature with strategic ambition; balances innovation with operational discipline; defensive moat thinking.

Innovation-forward; tolerant of operational disruption; fast learners; success defined by market reshape.

Risk posture

Governance-first. Prefers proven, audited solutions over leading-edge.

Balanced — willing to adopt newer tools when ROI is clear and disruption is bounded.

Calculated risk — pursues differentiation but with strong governance and proof points.

Risk-seeking — willing to accept failure rate for breakthrough upside.

Time horizon

12–24 month payback expectation; multi-year vendor relationships.

6–18 month payback; favors incremental wins over big bets.

18–36 month strategic horizon; willing to invest now for compounding returns.

6–12 month aggressive cycle; iterates fast; expects rapid scale-up if signal is strong.

Budget posture

Cost-defensive — prove ROI on the cost base before investing.

Efficiency-driven — invests when efficiency math is clear.

Outcome-driven — funds initiatives that compound competitive position.

Strategic-bet — funds high-variance bets when thesis is clear.

4.
Vendor Capsules by Quadrant

4. Vendor Capsules by Quadrant

Vendor Capsules by Quadrant

Enduring Innovators

In zero trust network access, the Enduring Innovators are the platform incumbents. Every vendor placed here sells private access as one function of a larger converged offering—a security service edge, a single-vendor SASE fabric, or, in one deliberate exception, a pure-play access architecture whose whole value is its refusal to converge. The purchase is correspondingly structural: a global point-of-presence network, a single-pass inspection path, and one policy plane spanning private, web, and SaaS traffic. Adjacent modules, including privileged remote access, enterprise browsers, and industrial gateways, are named, separately licensed dependencies. Once traffic steering, posture, and policy have been consolidated onto one of these fabrics, unwinding the decision is a multi-year project, which is exactly the commitment the buyer is choosing to make. The buyer here is an architecture owner making a strategic platform bet, trading time-to-value and vendor concentration risk for capability that compounds across the whole traffic estate.

Brown Money
Vendor
Access Provisioning Automation Depth
Access Troubleshooting and Diagnostics
Endpoint Agent Manageability
Identity Provider Integration Depth
Multi-Tenant and Distributed Org Management
OT and Non-Standard Endpoint Coverage
Session Reliability and Failover
VPN Migration Tooling
Average
Akamai3.54.54.53.53.02.53.53.03.5
Block Armour1.01.01.01.01.01.02.01.01.1
Cato Networks4.04.04.54.05.02.55.03.04.0
Cisco4.05.04.54.54.05.03.55.04.4
iboss3.05.03.54.04.02.54.05.03.9
Netskope4.03.54.54.53.53.55.04.04.1
Palo Alto Networks4.04.54.05.05.04.55.05.04.6
Versa Networks4.04.04.52.55.02.54.03.03.7
Zscaler4.55.05.05.04.04.05.05.04.7
Green Money
Vendor
Application Discovery and Onboarding
Automation and Orchestration API
Clientless Access Architecture
Connector and Relay Architecture
Policy Engine Architecture
SSE/SASE Platform Integration
Single Packet Authorization
Average
Akamai2.53.03.54.53.53.03.03.3
Block Armour1.01.01.01.02.0—1.01.0
Cato Networks3.04.52.53.54.05.03.03.6
Cisco3.03.51.54.04.03.53.53.3
iboss4.02.53.53.53.54.53.03.5
Netskope4.54.02.54.54.54.53.54.0
Palo Alto Networks3.03.51.54.54.55.03.53.6
Versa Networks2.02.52.53.02.54.54.03.0
Zscaler5.05.05.05.05.04.04.54.8
GRCS
Vendor
Access Audit Trail and Forensics
Continuous Session Risk Evaluation
Data Residency and Sovereignty Controls
Regulatory Compliance Mapping
Service Resilience and Availability
Supply Chain and Infrastructure Security
Third-Party and Contractor Access Governance
Zero Trust Architecture Integrity
Average
Akamai3.53.54.03.03.52.53.53.53.4
Block Armour1.02.02.01.02.01.02.02.01.6
Cato Networks4.02.54.54.54.53.53.52.53.7
Cisco4.04.52.54.04.54.54.03.53.9
iboss3.55.04.03.03.01.52.53.53.3
Netskope4.05.04.53.54.02.53.53.53.8
Palo Alto Networks4.05.04.53.54.53.55.03.54.2
Versa Networks3.54.54.53.53.52.53.03.53.6
Zscaler5.05.05.05.05.03.55.04.04.7
Emerging Tech
Vendor
AI-Driven Policy Automation
Quantum-Resistant Cryptography
Unified ZTNA and SSE Convergence
Universal ZTNA for OT/IoT
ZTNA for Agentic AI Workloads
Average
Akamai1.01.02.52.01.01.5
Block Armour1.0——1.01.50.7
Cato Networks3.02.54.54.04.53.7
Cisco4.01.04.05.04.03.6
iboss3.5—5.03.01.52.6
Netskope3.51.05.04.52.53.3
Palo Alto Networks3.53.04.54.53.03.7
Versa Networks4.02.55.04.51.03.4
Zscaler4.51.04.54.53.53.6

Akamai

Akamai Enterprise Application Access (EAA)

Challenger | Enduring Innovators | Fast Following

Summary:

Akamai Enterprise Application Access is a cloud-delivered ZTNA service that reaches private applications through outbound-dialling Enterprise Connectors and Akamai’s own Cloud Zones. A deployment is bought as an EAA subscription plus the connectors themselves, which are flexible in deployment terms: VMware, OpenStack, KVM and Hyper-V images, AWS, GCP and Azure instances, and an Akamai-provided Docker package. An optional EAA Client, now succeeded by the Zero Trust Client, carries the TCP and UDP applications the clientless path cannot. Administration runs through Akamai Control Center and Enterprise Center. Web and internet security alongside private access is a separate product, Secure Internet Access Enterprise.

Assessment:

Akamai’s strength is the connector. It ships in seven virtualization and cloud form factors plus a vendor-provided container image, dials out on 443 with no inbound firewall change, and carries TCP, UDP and tunnel-mode traffic rather than web protocols alone. The endpoint agent and the diagnostic surface are close behind, the latter running on four separate data feeds and more than eighty access-log fields, including an explicit deny reason and the ACL decision that produced it, with a catalogue of response codes carrying remediation guidance for each.

Operations teams that have to account for how an access decision was reached get the most here. The Data Edge that enforces is separated from the Management Edge that holds policy, device tiers are periodically re-derived and re-checked at the proxy on every request, the audit trail covers every log field by field with 365-day retention, and residency is settled component by component, with directory storage configurable in region. Clientless access is core architecture rather than a fallback, which is uncommon. Web, RDP and SSH applications are grouped together with per-application copy-and-paste, upload-and-download and RemoteApp controls, and the SSH private key stays on the connector so the user never handles the target credential.

The emerging criteria hold the most constrained results. Post-quantum key agreement does not reach the private-access path, policy does not adapt on its own, and agentic AI workloads are unaddressed. Akamai has substantial capability of this kind elsewhere in its portfolio, including hybrid post-quantum key exchange on the delivery edge and AI inferencing in Guardicore, and none of it reaches EAA. The remaining limit is commercial rather than technical. There is no availability commitment for the security services, which leaves resilience and failover without a contractual floor under them.

Taken together, EAA is a specialist’s private-access service, deep on the mechanics of getting a user to an application and quiet on what comes after. An organization whose access problem is operational, with applications spread across estates it already runs and decisions it has to account for afterwards, is well served. An organization that wants post-quantum protection on its private-access path, policy that adapts on its own, a route to agentic workloads, or a contractual availability commitment to hold Akamai to may find EAA thinner than it needs.

Block Armour

Zero Trust Unified Secure Access

Challenger | Enduring Innovators | Slow Following

Summary:

Block Armour’s Secure Shield Platform is a software-defined perimeter product distinguished by its use of a private permissioned blockchain as the identity substrate, with digital identities issued to users, devices, gateways and servers, and authentication and authorization keying on those signatures rather than on IP addresses. A deployment comprises an SDP controller carrying the policy engine and secured gateways fronting cloud workloads and IoT devices, deployable on-prem, in cloud or hybrid, and listed on the Azure, Oracle Cloud, and Indian GeM marketplaces. Three solutions are built on the same base: zero trust remote access, server protection, and IoT Armour for connected-device estates. Block Armour is a small vendor selling toward critical infrastructure, smart-city and Industry 4.0 buyers.

Assessment:

Block Armour’s strength is the architecture built around that identity substrate. TThe controller carries a policy engine that authenticates and authorizes endpoints before access is granted, while a gateway fronts the protected servers. The control plane and data plane are separate, and protected servers are cloaked from view. Together, these components create a named broker that performs per-resource authorization. The same design makes the non-human principal a first-class subject, since blockchain identities are issued to servers and gateways as well as to people, which few products in this research offer.

Operators of connected-device estates get the most here. IoT Armour applies the same identity model to those estates, the platform runs on-premises, in cloud or hybrid so it can follow an estate that is largely on the ground, and procurement can go through the Azure, Oracle Cloud or Indian GeM marketplaces. For a critical-infrastructure, smart-city or Industry 4.0 buyer whose subjects are more often machines than people, one base platform covering remote access, server protection and connected-device access is the argument.

The platform is a perimeter product and nothing beside it. There is no web gateway, CASB, DLP or firewall service in it, so it stands next to a security service edge stack rather than converging with one, and there is nothing for a wider SASE platform to integrate. The access decision rests on blockchain identity and posture checks with no model in the path, so policy does not adapt on its own to what it sees. Data-plane cryptography is 4096-bit RSA, with no post-quantum successor behind it. The controller and gateway pair has no component credential model of its own, and outside the architecture and the identity substrate the platform is thinly developed. A subsequent vendor questionnaire filled some of that gap, documenting redundant gateway licensing, continuous device-posture re-evaluation, multi-attribute policy conditions, time-bound access, and customer-controlled data residency, though most of the operational surface an enterprise deployment leans on is still handled elsewhere.

Reach is the constraint here, not the idea. The blockchain identity substrate and the cloaked, plane-separated architecture are distinctive, and machine identities reach gateways and servers as readily as people, but this is a small vendor with one platform, and the product stops at the perimeter it draws. Organizations that expect a converged security stack, a policy engine that adapts on its own, or a cryptographic path with a post-quantum successor in it will want to weigh how much of their programme this leaves them to build around it.

Cato Networks

Cato SASE Cloud

Leader | Enduring Innovators | Outpacing

Summary:

Cato SASE Cloud is a single-vendor SASE platform in which ZTNA is delivered from Cato’s own global PoP fabric rather than bolted on as a module. A deployment is bought as a subscription across three elements: Sockets at each site, comprising X1500, X1600 and X1700 appliances or vSockets for AWS, Azure, GCP and VMware ESXi and available through the AWS and Azure marketplaces; App Connectors placed beside private applications; and per-user ZTNA licensing for the Cato Client, with a clientless Browser Access Portal for users and third parties who cannot install an agent. Policy, events and administration all run in one Cato Management Application.

Assessment:

Cato’s strength is platform delivery. The SPACE architecture evaluates networking and security engines in parallel over a single pass with no service chaining, and one event schema spans private-application, SaaS and internet traffic, which makes platform integration its strongest result. Session reliability and multi-tenant management are close behind, on a five-nines commitment with a public per-PoP status history, automatic tunnel migration to the nearest available PoP, and a partner console whose tenant lifecycle runs through the GraphQL API rather than the console alone. Service resilience, ZTNA and SSE convergence, and endpoint agent manageability are all well evidenced. Among the emerging criteria, agentic AI access is the standout, with inline inspection of prompts, model outputs and tool calls and per-invocation tracing, in a criterion where most products offer nothing. OT and IoT access is also well developed, on named industrial protocols and passive device fingerprinting.

Organizations that run their estate as code get the most here. The automation result rests on a versioned GraphQL API, a vendor-maintained Terraform provider covering private applications, connectors, policies and groups, and a deprecation practice. That same infrastructure-as-code surface carries the policy engine and provisioning depth with it, the latter through directory-sourced provisioning with expiring grants. Compliance and residency sit alongside, on a self-serve trust portal and region-anchored management tenancies with in-region processing enforcement. Together they describe a product built to be operated and audited at a distance rather than configured by hand.

The constraints sit on zero-trust mechanics rather than on the platform. Authentication, authorization, and enforcement share a single trust plane inside the PoP, and posture re-evaluation is timer-driven rather than event-triggered, which makes architecture integrity and continuous session risk evaluation the most constrained results; single packet authorization sits alongside them. The browser portal publishes web applications and brokers RDP and SSH without the clipboard, download or session-recording controls the more developed clientless implementations provide, so a session opened from an unmanaged device cannot be constrained once it is running.

The trade is explicit. Cato competes as a consolidated platform play, and the strength is concentrated in delivery and operations rather than in zero-trust architectural mechanics: one fabric, one console, one event schema, and an estate that can be run by API. An organization buying network and security together, content for identity and enforcement to share a trust plane, is well served by that. Buyers whose zero-trust requirement is architectural, wanting separated planes, event-driven re-evaluation or a tightly fenced clientless path, may find the platform strengths do not answer it.

Cisco

Cisco Secure Access (SSE/ZTNA)

Leader | Enduring Innovators | Outpacing

Summary:

Cisco Secure Access is a cloud-delivered SSE platform whose ZTNA function is carried by the Zero Trust Access module of Cisco Secure Client, with Resource Connectors deployed in VMware, AWS, Azure or Docker reaching outward to Cisco’s regional data centres, and administration through Security Cloud Control. Several of the strongest results below reach beyond the entry licence: Secure Equipment Access with Cyber Vision for industrial access is a separate purchase, while the agentic AI controls and user trust scoring arrive with the Advantage tier, and AI Defense extends the agent controls further. Experience Insights is powered by ThousandEyes.

Assessment:

Cisco’s strength is industrial access. Universal ZTNA for OT and IoT is its strongest result, and no other product in this research matches its coverage of the industrial story. Secure Equipment Access runs its gateway function as an IOx application inside Catalyst IE3300, IE3400, IE3500 and IE9300 rugged switches and IR1100 routers, brokering clientless RDP, VNC, HTTP/S, SSH and Telnet to OT assets with scheduled windows, request-and-approve workflows and inline session recording. Cyber Vision supplies asset identity, and the ISA3000 filters individual IEC 104 and IEC 61850 commands. It is a complete industrial story, and it is a separate purchase. Coverage of OT and other non-standard endpoints is strongly evidenced alongside it, as is diagnostics, the most impressive result on its own merits. The zero trust access log attributes every evaluated condition separately, covering verdict, ruleset and rule identifiers, posture identifier and individual posture signals, plus possible-match fields showing what nearly applied. The Cisco Assistant answers a plain-language question about why a named user cannot reach a named destination with a nine-check failure analysis.

Organizations already standing on Cisco infrastructure get the most here. VPN migration tooling rests on a Discover Private Resources report that mines thirty days of VPN and ZTNA traffic into reviewable suggestions with bulk actions. That matters most to a buyer with an installed VPN estate to retire. Behind that, supply chain and infrastructure security rests on a CSAF machine-readable advisory archive covering the client itself, and continuous session risk evaluation on posture assessed at every resource access rather than once at join. Service resilience runs on hybrid anycast with paired data centres per region, and identity provider integration on six SAML and three OIDC providers plus a user trust profile that forces mid-session re-authentication. Together they describe a product built for an estate that already runs on Cisco parts.

Data residency is the most constrained result. Residency is handled per data category, so the event log warehouse can be switched between North America and Europe rather than the tenant being provisioned into a chosen region. A buyer with a strict in-country requirement has no way to meet it. Clientless access is limited too, since browser-based access arrives without the per-application content controls the more developed implementations offer, so an unmanaged-device session cannot be fenced the way a managed one can. Post-quantum protection does not reach the ZTNA path at all, though Cisco ships post-quantum key agreement elsewhere in the portfolio.

Read as a whole, this is the portfolio incumbent’s offer. Cisco competes here on a breadth of adjacent capability few vendors assemble, and little of it arrives in one SKU. The industrial story is a separate purchase, and the agentic AI controls and user trust scoring need the Advantage tier, so the entry licence alone buys a narrower product than the results above suggest. For an industrial or mixed OT estate already buying Cisco networking, that trade is straightforward. Buyers needing tenant-level data residency, or fenced browser-based access for unmanaged devices, may find this thinner than the platform’s breadth implies.

iboss

iboss Zero Trust SASE Platform

Leader | Enduring Innovators | Fast Following

Summary:

ZTNA is one function of iboss’s consolidated Zero Trust SASE platform, which is sold in three packages, Zero Trust Core, Zero Trust Advanced and Zero Trust Complete, rather than as a component list. The platform is built on containerization. Every customer runs dedicated containerized gateways on dedicated IP address space, each one an isolated policy enforcement point performing decryption, DLP, CASB, malware defence, ZTNA and logging, and capacity scales horizontally. Endpoints run the iboss Cloud Connector on Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, iOS and ChromeOS. Private resources are reached through the iboss Network Connector, shipped as a vendor-provided Docker image, through iboss gateway appliances deployed in the branch office, and through IPSec tunnels configured from existing firewalls to the iboss cloud service. Browser Isolation supplies a clientless guest path with no agent installed.

Assessment:

iboss’s strength is showing an operator why a decision came out the way it did. Policy Tracing captures, for a named user, the policy and security engine logic behind each event, covering user and group attributes, the decryption reasoning, the adaptive-access score and the final allow or block, opening from the matching event log row. Few products here show an operator the reasoning rather than the result. That decision is taken on every request between user, device and resource, with malware defence and content inspection applied inline to public and private resources alike.

Buyers who want one enforcement point rather than a stack of them get the most here. Because each gateway carries the whole stack on its own dedicated address space, private access, web filtering and data protection are settled in one place, on one policy engine and one console. The same isolation gives each tenant its own scope, with custom administrative roles and full control over users, resources and policies. App and Service Discovery continuously catalogs SaaS, cloud and on-premises resources, including shell terminals, RDP servers and printers.

Cryptography is the one clear outlier. The private-access data plane is a WireGuard-based routed peering session that no post-quantum algorithm reaches, which iboss accepts rather than contests. Supplier practice is the least developed part of the platform: the advisory archive carries one entry against an iboss product flaw, no disclosure policy tells a researcher where to go, and nothing signs the artefacts the platform ships. Agentic access reaches service accounts and tells account types apart, without a workload principal of its own. The Network Connector asks nothing inbound; the inbound path belongs to an optional onsite gateway acting as a Private Access Broker.

The architecture is iboss’s argument. Per-tenant containerized gateways carrying the whole stack are what produce the tracing, the per-request decision and the single console, and an organization buying consolidation and tenant isolation together is well served by them. What the architecture does not settle is the cryptography beneath it or the supplier practice around it. An organization with a post-quantum requirement is likely to want more than a WireGuard data plane currently offers, and anyone shortlisting on a supplier’s vulnerability handling and artifact signing may find this thinner than they need.

Netskope

Netskope Private Access

Leader | Enduring Innovators | Outpacing

Summary:

Netskope One Private Access is the ZTNA function of a converged SSE platform, and it is bought as part of that platform rather than as a standalone service. A deployment uses the Netskope Client for steering, Publishers deployed beside private applications on AWS, Azure, GCP, Hyper-V, VMware ESXi, or Ubuntu and RHEL hosts, plus a vendor-account container image, with the NewEdge point-of-presence network for delivery. Publishers run active-active with up to sixteen per application, and Browser Access supplies a zero-install path for contractors and BYOD. Several capabilities credited here are adjacent Netskope One components named as dependencies: Device Intelligence for OT asset discovery, the AI Gateway and MCP Gateway for agent workloads, and the Enterprise Browser.

Assessment:

Netskope’s strength is that the convergence is architectural rather than assembled. One client, one data plane and one inspection pass carry private access, with real-time protection policies for private applications drawing DLP and threat objects from the same libraries as web and SaaS rules. The platform integration result reflects the same design. Continuous session risk evaluation is equally strong, and the most consequential of these results for a security buyer. Private-application traffic is adjudicated per transaction at the proxy edge, with download, upload and FormPost as distinct activities, actions of Allow, Block and Periodic Authentication, and content-aware DLP and threat inspection reaching private traffic rather than only web and SaaS. Session reliability is the third standout, on active-active publishers with sub-five-second switching, latency-bucketed selection and a dated per-datacentre incident history.

Organizations with several populations to serve get the most here. Up to ten SAML accounts for private applications sit in one tenant with email-domain routing per population, and twelve UEM platforms across six operating systems are named for endpoint management. Agentless browser-based RDP and SSH combine with Device Intelligence asset discovery to reach OT and other non-standard endpoints. Contractor access rests on the same Privileged Remote Access that serves those endpoints, holding credentials in the Netskope Vault and injecting them into clientless RDP and SSH sessions so the user never handles the target credential. Each session produces a downloadable recording. Around that, NewEdge Traffic Management Zones restrict a tenant’s inline processing to a named region, and the container image and six deployment targets cover connector deployment. App Segment Discovery works alongside a Private Access AIOps Agent that proposes narrowed segments with their associated real-time policies and presents each for explicit approval or rejection. Cloud Exchange Risk Exchange ingests third-party risk scores from more than thirty named providers and drives orchestrated actions from them, but those scores do not reach a private-access policy condition. Together they describe a product built for an organization running employees, contractors and machines through one policy plane.

Post-quantum protection is intent rather than shipping capability. ML-KEM 768 and a quantum-resilient Netskope One are in development, but neither is yet on either ZTNA leg. Browser Access is constrained by protocol rather than by missing controls: it supports HTTP/1.1 with TLS 1.2 and 1.3 only, not HTTP/2 or HTTP/3, and WebSocket traffic bypasses inspection. An application that depends on either falls outside the clientless path. Clipboard control is present. Agentic AI access is limited by the identity chain rather than by packaging. The agent controls in the AI Gateway are real, but an agent principal cannot be issued short-lived or auto-rotated credentials automatically, and there is no federation from an external workload identity source. Supply chain handling rests on a PSIRT and a twenty-two-entry advisory archive, with no committed remediation window.

What this adds up to is a platform play rather than an access specialism. Netskope competes as a converged SSE platform, and private access inherits the inspection, policy and residency machinery built for web and SaaS traffic. For a buyer consolidating all three onto one plane, and especially one admitting contractors, BYOD and OT alongside employees, that inheritance is the argument. Buyers who want private access as a standalone service, or who need post-quantum protection or an agent identity model on the private path now, will be weighing what ships against what is still described as in development.

Palo Alto Networks

Prisma Access ZTNA

Leader | Enduring Innovators | Fast Following

Summary:

Prisma Access is Palo Alto Network’s cloud-delivered SASE platform, and ZTNA is one function of a stack that also carries firewall-as-a-service, secure web gateway, CASB and data loss prevention on the same single-pass inspection path. A deployment uses GlobalProtect on managed endpoints, ZTNA Connector virtual machines beside private applications, available as marketplace images for AWS, GCP, Azure and OCI or as ESXi, KVM and Hyper-V images on-prem, and service connections into the customer’s own network, all administered through Strata Cloud Manager across more than 150 points of presence. Several results below depend on separately licensed additions named as dependencies: Secure Agentless Access for browser-delivered RDP, SSH and VNC, the Prisma Browser for session recording and live oversight, Enterprise DLP, Autonomous DEM, Device Security and the Strata Logging Service.

Assessment:

Palo Alto Network’s strength is control over a session already in progress. Third-party and contractor access governance is one of its strongest results, and the combination is what earns it. Clientless VPN and the Prisma Browser connector give contractors a path with no installed agent, schedules bound to policy objects supply expiring grants, an administrator can watch and terminate a session in flight, and remote browser isolation profiles set clipboard, upload, download, print and watermark controls by tier. Continuous session risk evaluation is equally strong. Host information profile checks run hourly while the agent is connected, and a posture change mid-session changes the rule that applies. Risk signals from a third-party identity provider feed the same control, so a session revocation or a credential change at the provider can terminate an active session or force re-authentication. Per-request WAF, rate-limiter and throttle policies reach applications behind service connections and ZTNA connectors, which puts inline inspection on the private path rather than at the web edge alone.

Organizations buying the whole platform get the most here. Four further results complete a group of six. Session reliability and failover rest on a 99.999% SLA with a graduated credit table and dated per-location incident history. Multi-tenant and distributed org management is a genuine tenant hierarchy with license allocation and a Tenancy Service API. VPN migration tooling runs on wildcard target discovery and inventory-derived application sources. Platform integration puts Layer 3 to 7 single-pass inspection behind one DLP policy covering access and data together. Six more results run deep as well: agentless OT access with industrial protocol depth, unified convergence, a policy engine with a maintained Terraform provider, connector architecture across four clouds and three hypervisors, resilience across 152 points of presence with cross-cloud failover, and a named processing country for each platform service. Together they describe a product built to carry a whole traffic estate rather than private applications alone.

Clientless access is the most constrained result, and it is a legacy of the platform’s history rather than a capability gap. The clientless path in Prisma Access is GlobalProtect Clientless VPN, a reverse proxy that rewrites application pages for browser delivery. The more current capability lives in the separately licensed Secure Agentless Access and Prisma Browser instead, so a buyer on the base licence who reaches for browser-based access gets the older mechanism. Application discovery promotes learned FQDNs but supplies neither a policy template nor a sanction state, leaving the last step of onboarding to be done by hand. Quantum-resistant cryptography reaches the client leg, where ML-KEM key establishment attaches to GlobalProtect portals and gateways, but not the leg from the edge into the customer network, and agentic AI access rests on a machine-certificate principal rather than an agent identity model.

For an organization already using the wider Prisma Access stack, Private Access is particularly strong once a session is established. It provides live oversight of third-party activity, re-evaluates posture hourly rather than only at connection, and extends inline inspection to private applications. The dependencies are the thing to weigh. Secure Agentless Access, the Prisma Browser, Enterprise DLP, Autonomous DEM, Device Security and the Strata Logging Service are separately licensed, and several of the results above rest on them. A buyer pricing the base ZTNA licence alone may find the capability thinner than this reads. Organizations wanting browser-based access as a first-class path, or post-quantum protection across both legs of the path, are likely to want more than this offers today.

Versa

Versa Secure Private Access

Challenger | Enduring Innovators | Fast Following

Summary:

Versa SASE is a full-stack single-vendor platform in which ZTNA, sold as Versa Secure Private Access, runs on the same Versa Operating System that carries the company’s SD-WAN business rather than on a dedicated lightweight connector. A deployment is orchestrated from Concerto with Versa Director beneath it, steering the Versa SASE Client to roughly a hundred Versa Cloud Gateways worldwide, with private-application reachability carried over an IPsec tunnel from the gateway into the customer datacenter. Clientless access runs through an Apache Guacamole HTML5 gateway covering HTTP, HTTPS, RDP, SSH and VNC. Industrial deployments add the CSG620h, a DIN-mountable hardened appliance running VOS natively

Versa’s strength is multi-tenancy. A genuine parent-organization and subtenant hierarchy lets parents see all subtenant routing while subtenants see only their own. Reusable profiles cascade from the parent and can be overridden at the tenant, and tenant-scoped administrator roles carry their own credentials. Inheritance with per-tenant override is rare among the products here. Convergence is the other standout, and it rests on object sharing rather than console adjacency. One DLP profile associates with an internet protection rule and a private application protection rule alike, the private-application rule wizard exposes malware protection and IPS profiles, and both rule types match on the same users, groups and endpoint information profiles. One SASE client supplies posture, endpoint DLP and monitoring for all of it.

Assessment:

Service providers and multi-site enterprises get the most here. Posture is re-checked continuously rather than at connection. Standard endpoint information profiles send a full snapshot every ten minutes, real-time profiles send incremental deltas at a configurable ten-second interval, and the gateway re-evaluates and adjusts access on what arrives. Industrial sites get the CSG620h, which runs on-premises ZTNA, NAC, micro-segmentation and device fingerprinting at the edge, and a tenant region step assigns named gateways against a city-level inventory. Together they describe a product built for an operator running access on many tenants’ behalf, site by site.

The constraints cluster in the access product’s own detail rather than in the platform. Policy conditions are broad, covering posture, managed state, OS, risk bands and geolocation, but the engine around them is thin. Schedule objects offer daily and weekly recurrence and a non-recurring option with a start and end date and time. There is no policy API to drive the engine from outside either. Application onboarding is hand work, since private applications are authored as FQDN objects one at a time and the discovery Versa offers covers shadow SaaS rather than private applications. Automation is inconsistent rather than absent, with a broad but unversioned Director REST API and no deprecation commitment behind it. Agentic AI access is unaddressed, with no non-human principal to govern, and post-quantum key exchange reaches the IPsec tunnels behind private access, using ML-KEM alongside classical ECDH, but not the client-to-gateway leg.

Versa’s networking heritage explains both halves of this. It competes as the networking-led alternative to the security-led SASE vendors, and multi-tenancy is where that heritage shows most. The tenancy model, the object sharing and the posture loop are all stronger than the access product’s own policy and onboarding detail. An operator running access for many tenants, with industrial sites to reach, is well served. Buyers who expect to drive access policy from an API, or to have private applications discovered rather than typed in, will find the platform ahead of the product on those points.

Zscaler

Zscaler Private Access (ZPA)

Leader | Enduring Innovators | Outpacing

Summary:

Zscaler Private Access is the ZTNA function of the Zero Trust Exchange, Zscaler’s converged security platform. A deployment uses Zscaler Client Connector on managed endpoints, App Connectors deployed beside private applications, and Public or Private Service Edges brokering sessions across more than 150 data centres, with a Central Authority holding policy. App Connectors ship as VMware and Nutanix OVAs, as AWS, Azure and GCP marketplace images, as Docker, Kubernetes Helm and OpenShift containers, and as RHEL packages. Two adjacent SKUs are named as dependencies for several of the strongest results below: Privileged Remote Access, which delivers clientless RDP, SSH and VNC with credential vaulting and session recording, and Zero Trust Browser. Almost nothing here is bought standalone.

Assessment:

Zscaler’s strength is breadth without soft spots. It returns the maximum result on well over half the criteria assessed, and on five of them no other product in this research matches it. Passive discovery runs against wildcard segments into a fourteen-day widget, with guided promotion into pre-populated application segments. The clientless path combines Browser Access for unmanaged devices with privileged consoles that deliver RDP, SSH, VNC and RealVNC in the browser under per-rule clipboard, upload and download controls. Connector coverage extends to every deployment target the criterion names, including a branch form factor and per-segment ICMP control expressed in Terraform. The customer chooses the log storage jurisdiction at deployment, and session recordings stay in the tenant’s region. The access audit trail covers every log type field by field and streams to any receiver.

Organizations consolidating access onto a single platform get the most here. Identity handling is the deepest in this research, with multiple concurrent identity providers bound by authentication domain and a Shared Signals Framework receiver that consumes entity-risk-change events and terminates existing sessions on them. Availability is committed rather than described, a 99.999% figure and credit table sitting alongside connector groups, service edge redundancy and a public advisory history. Eight more results are as strong: policy engine architecture, the automation and orchestration API, service resilience, continuous session risk evaluation, regulatory compliance mapping, access troubleshooting and diagnostics, endpoint agent manageability and VPN migration tooling. Together they describe a product built to be run as an estate rather than deployed as a point solution.

Quantum-resistant cryptography is the one clear outlier. Post-quantum key agreement reaches SSL inspection on the internet path, using ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA, while the Z-Tunnel carrying private access remains classical TLS 1.3 with AES-256-GCM. Given how much of the rest is covered, that reads as a sequencing question rather than a capability one. The broker accepts TCP and TLS before authentication, leaving a listener reachable ahead of any identity decision. Agentic AI access rests on machine groups and workload identity rather than an agent registry, with the announced AI Broker not yet available to assess. Supply chain and infrastructure security is short only of an SBOM, which is not available.

Zscaler is the most complete private-access implementation in this research, and it is inseparable from the platform it belongs to. Almost nothing is bought standalone, and several of the strongest results depend on Privileged Remote Access or Zero Trust Browser being licensed alongside. Buyers who can make that commitment get a private-access capability few competitors match on any single criterion. Buyers who want private access as a discrete component, who need post-quantum protection on the private-access path now, or who are building around an agent identity model will want to weigh those constraints first.

Disruptive Pioneers

The Disruptive Pioneers in this market each sell an architectural thesis rather than a feature list. One product refuses to let anything it protects listen on the network at all, issuing cryptographic identities to every workload and offering embeddable software libraries so applications themselves become unreachable except through the fabric. Another inverts the deployment model: every component the buyer runs lives in the buyer’s own infrastructure, with no vendor cloud in the traffic path and no quorum to lose. A third delivers private applications through a remotely executed browser, so unmanaged devices receive only rendering information and never touch the application. All three are genuinely novel positions the rest of the field does not offer. The common trade is also definitional for the quadrant: enterprise scaffolding—compliance attestations, published trust pages, SCIM provisioning, administrator documentation—is still filling in behind the architecture. The buyer is betting on a design, and accepts that procurement diligence will find gaps the engineering does not have.

Brown Money
Vendor
Access Provisioning Automation Depth
Access Troubleshooting and Diagnostics
Endpoint Agent Manageability
Identity Provider Integration Depth
Multi-Tenant and Distributed Org Management
OT and Non-Standard Endpoint Coverage
Session Reliability and Failover
VPN Migration Tooling
Average
Bowtie3.03.53.01.52.51.03.52.52.6
Menlo Security3.03.03.04.02.52.53.04.03.1
NetFoundry3.52.01.54.03.51.53.53.02.8
Trend Micro4.04.03.53.54.52.52.53.53.5
Green Money
Vendor
Application Discovery and Onboarding
Automation and Orchestration API
Clientless Access Architecture
Connector and Relay Architecture
Policy Engine Architecture
SSE/SASE Platform Integration
Single Packet Authorization
Average
Bowtie2.03.5—4.51.52.53.52.5
Menlo Security3.02.04.03.03.04.03.03.1
NetFoundry2.04.01.04.51.51.05.02.7
Trend Micro3.52.51.53.52.53.02.02.6
GRCS
Vendor
Access Audit Trail and Forensics
Continuous Session Risk Evaluation
Data Residency and Sovereignty Controls
Regulatory Compliance Mapping
Service Resilience and Availability
Supply Chain and Infrastructure Security
Third-Party and Contractor Access Governance
Zero Trust Architecture Integrity
Average
Bowtie2.51.54.51.03.51.01.52.52.3
Menlo Security3.02.51.03.53.51.52.53.02.6
NetFoundry2.53.03.51.54.02.52.54.53.0
Trend Micro3.04.03.04.03.53.52.02.53.2
Emerging Tech
Vendor
AI-Driven Policy Automation
Quantum-Resistant Cryptography
Unified ZTNA and SSE Convergence
Universal ZTNA for OT/IoT
ZTNA for Agentic AI Workloads
Average
Bowtie——2.5—2.00.9
Menlo Security2.53.03.52.02.02.6
NetFoundry2.01.0—3.53.52.0
Trend Micro4.51.03.52.01.02.4

Bowtie

Bowtie Private Access

Challenger | Disruptive Pioneers | Fast Following

Summary:

Bowtie Private Access is a young zero-trust access product built on WireGuard and designed so that no vendor-operated component sits in the traffic path. Everything the buyer runs is self-hosted, with controllers deployed into their own cloud accounts or datacenters, available as AWS AMIs, an Azure community gallery image, Google Compute Engine images, VMware OVA and VMDK, Hyper-V VHDX, Proxmox, KVM qcow2, Xen and Incus images, OCI container images and a Kubernetes Helm chart, with Terraform modules and cloud-init seeding. Clients cover Windows, macOS, iOS and several Linux distributions. The only Bowtie-operated service is a Meta Control Plane that distributes software and vulnerability data.

Assessment:

Bowtie’s strength is the number of ways its controller can be run. The form factors above reach more hypervisors and cloud images than any other product in this research offers alongside both a container image and a Helm chart, and because those controllers run wholly in the customer’s own regions, data residency is satisfied by construction rather than by configuration. The multi-controller design carries as much again. No controller is primary, each holds a continuously synchronized copy of configuration and policy, and clients maintain live tunnels to every controller at once, in a model that is quorum-free and partition-tolerant, which is what makes both failover and service resilience hold up. The REST API serves its own OpenAPI specification, a Terraform provider covers all four core object types, and a policy-explain endpoint lets an access assertion run before a change is deployed, which is a wide automation surface for a vendor this size. Telemetry carries a policy-verdict record that names the deciding rule and marks the default-deny case.

Buyers who will not put a vendor cloud in the access path get the most here. Bowtie operates nothing that carries traffic; the single service it runs distributes software and vulnerability data, and everything else lands in the buyer’s own cloud accounts or datacenters, seeded through Terraform modules and cloud-init. That suits an engineering-led team with hypervisor and Kubernetes practice already in place, and an organization whose residency obligations are easier to meet by choosing the region itself than by asking a provider to choose one for it.

The sharpest limit is architectural. There is no clientless path, so every user needs the client installed, and that boundary accounts for most of what a larger organization would miss. Non-standard endpoints, and the OT and IoT devices that cannot take an agent, stay out of reach, and third-party access is awkward, since a contractor reaches nothing until the client is on their machine. Elsewhere the product is early. Identity integration runs through an embedded connector framework configured by seeding YAML files, and account lifecycle arrives through SCIM with Okta and Entra and an LDAP sync, though session and risk signals from the identity provider stop at the front door. The policy engine’s authoring surface is capable, but the set of source matchers it can decide on is thin. Session risk is re-evaluated on a timer. Neither post-quantum cryptography nor AI-driven policy automation is present. For an enterprise buyer the two most consequential are the security process and the compliance position, since there is no vulnerability disclosure policy and no advisory archive behind the product, and the frameworks it names carry no third-party attestation.

For a team that would rather own the access path than rent it, Bowtie is a close fit, and what it asks in return is clear enough: the buyer supplies the operating capacity, and in exchange nothing the vendor runs touches the traffic. A buyer with unmanaged devices, contractors to admit at short notice, or OT and IoT endpoints that cannot take an agent may find the client-only model thinner than they need. Organizations provisioning from a directory at scale, or shortlisting on a vendor’s security process and compliance position, will want to weigh how young this product still is.

Menlo Security

Menlo Security Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA)

Challenger | Disruptive Pioneers | Fast Following

Summary:

Menlo Security approaches zero-trust access from browser isolation rather than from networking, and the architecture follows. Secure Application Access delivers private applications through the Menlo Secure Cloud Browser, where every web request executes remotely and only rendering information reaches the endpoint. The same path carries remote servers and desktops, with SSH and RDP rendered in the browser, and legacy thick-client applications. It is bought as part of the wider Menlo Secure platform alongside secure web gateway, remote browser isolation, last-mile data protection and firewall-as-a-service, with connectors deployed beside the applications in AWS, Azure, GCP, VMware or Hyper-V. Access is clientless by default, with an optional Secure Extension for managed Chrome. Menlo Security sells the portfolio as Protect, Secure and Manage, priced on the products taken and the number of users.

Assessment:

Menlo Security’s strength is that one enforcement point carries both kinds of traffic. Private applications and internet destinations pass through the same Secure Cloud Browser, and bidirectional last-mile data protection governs downloads from internal applications and uploads to the internet from one console. The clientless path reaches further than that design suggests: SSH and RDP render in the browser with no client installed, so remote servers and desktops arrive on unmanaged devices on the same terms as web applications. Nothing on the customer side listens; the connector dials outward, and the policy decision sits apart from the enforcement path.

The buyer this suits is one whose hardest access problem is the device it does not control. Contractors, BYOD users and anyone on an unmanaged machine reach private applications, servers and desktops through a browser with nothing installed, and the Secure Extension covers managed Chrome. The shape also favours an organization consolidating web gateway, browser isolation, data protection and an inline CASB onto one platform, since private access arrives as part of that purchase. FedRAMP Rev. 5, TX-RAMP and CMMC 2.0 make the United States public sector and its suppliers a natural fit.

The limits follow from where the product runs. Everything executes in Menlo’s cloud, and tenant-specific region affinity enables provisioning a tenant to a chosen region while allowing administrators to pin each application connector to named regions, such as US East.

. A policy API creates, reads and updates applications, rules, connectors and users, but infrastructure-as-code arrives as deployment scripts from Customer Success rather than a provider a team pulls from a public registry, and connectors ship without a vendor-supplied container image or chart. Menlo offers a per-application protocol selector for TCP, UDP, and ICMP to carry private application traffic to the Application Connector.

Menlo came to zero-trust access from the isolation side, and the product still reads that way: the session runs inside its browser, and private applications are one more thing that browser reaches. Buyers who need data to stay in a region they choose may find this thinner than they need. An organization that declares its access layer as code, or that needs private-application UDP carried to the connector, will want to weigh what the platform leaves to something else.

NetFoundry

NetFoundry Zero Trust Networking

Challenger | Disruptive Pioneers | Fast Following

Summary:

NetFoundry Zero Trust Networking is the commercial platform built on OpenZiti. Nothing it protects listens; a workload dials out to the fabric and proves identity with a mutual X.509 certificate, so a port scan finds no open port and no address to target. A deployment uses Raft-clustered controllers holding identities, services and policy, customer-hosted edge routers forming the enforcement mesh, and tunnelers for Windows, macOS, Linux, Android and iOS, or embedded SDKs where the application itself can be made Ziti-aware. NetFoundry operates a control plane and fabric across a large point-of-presence footprint, with self-hosting offered for data-residency and air-gapped cases. It is sold as connectivity infrastructure, and the vendor positions it as complementing SASE suites rather than replacing them.

Assessment:

NetFoundry’s strength is the connection model itself. Identity-defined, authorize-before-connect reachability is carried further here than in any other product in this research. Every connection class, covering control, link, edge and management, is mutually authenticated; protected workloads never listen; certificates rotate seven days before expiry with no administrator action; and both TCP and UDP are handled. The connector and relay layer and the integrity of the zero-trust model rest on the same foundation, with customer-hosted edge routers needing no inbound ports by default and the design mapped to NIST SP 800-207. Resilience is built the same way, on Raft consensus whose quorum arithmetic sets out how many members of a three-, five- or seven-node cluster can be lost, with leader re-election when the leader goes, and with defined behaviour when the control plane becomes unreachable, where existing sessions continue and disconnected controllers serve stale reads. External JWT signers admit workloads from any OIDC issuer with automatic certificate enrolment, which is what carries agentic AI access, and tunnelers install directly on OT gateways, IPCs and PLCs without opening inbound ports.

Buyers who would rather run the access layer than subscribe to it get the most here. Edge routers sit in the customer’s own estate, controllers can be self-hosted for data residency or air-gapped operation, and an application that can be made Ziti-aware embeds the SDK instead of taking a tunnel, which suits an engineering team willing to treat access as part of its own infrastructure. The same shape serves an OT estate, where the tunneler goes onto the gateway, IPC or PLC itself, and a workload fleet that authenticates from an existing OIDC issuer. Because the product is sold as connectivity infrastructure and positioned beside a SASE suite rather than against one, it fits an organization that has already settled where its web security comes from.

Several of the limits are scope decisions, and the product line stopping at connectivity accounts for them. There is no secure web gateway, CASB or DLP in the line for private access to converge with. An MCP server puts Ziti configuration, services and policy under natural-language administration, but every operation is administrator-directed, and nothing derives policy from observed access. The cryptography is classical, using libsodium’s XChaCha20-Poly1305 with an ephemeral exchange, and the post-quantum position is a staged plan aligned to FIPS 203, 204 and 205, including hybrid key establishment, with nothing shipping today. The rest sits at the edges of the architecture rather than in it. There is no clientless path, so a browser on its own reaches nothing. Application onboarding is close to manual: zLAN network discovery surfaces observed flows by source, destination, port and protocol, but nothing documents promotion into a Ziti service definition, so every intercept and host config is still authored by hand. Agent handling is thin at fleet scale, with no deployment path through unified endpoint management and no unattended install, though enrolment itself is flexible, running on a one-time JWT or QR code, a certificate or CA-backed path, or federation to an external OIDC issuer. Compliance is the limit most likely to matter to an enterprise buyer and the easiest to close, since the attestations named on the home page are not backed by a certificate number, an audit scope statement or a report date, though a SOC 2 report can be requested under NDA.

NetFoundry is an access fabric sold as infrastructure, built around removing the listening port rather than guarding it, and it is strongest where the buyer owns the machines at both ends of the connection. An organization that wants private access and web security decided in one console, or that needs unmanaged and third-party devices reaching applications through a browser, will want to weigh how much of that this product leaves to something else. Teams provisioning agents across a large managed fleet, or shortlisting on compliance attestations whose scope and date they can inspect, are likely to want more than this offers today.

Trend Micro

Vision One Zero Trust Secure Access

Challenger | Disruptive Pioneers | Slow Following

Summary:

Zero Trust Secure Access is an application inside Trend Vision One rather than a standalone product, and it arrives as four services under one console: Risk Control, Private Access for internal applications, Internet Access as the secure web gateway, and AI Secure Access for generative-AI content inspection. A deployment installs the Secure Access Module on endpoints, often through the existing Endpoint Security Agent, and Private Access Connectors beside the applications, available for VMware ESXi, Hyper-V, Nutanix AHV, Azure, AWS and Google Cloud and deployed at least two per connector group. External users and endpoints that cannot host the module reach applications through an agentless User Portal.

Assessment:

Trend Micro’s strength is that the risk score does the enforcing. Risk Control rules express conditions over a vendor-computed score alongside identity, time and location, and the actions they carry execute and revoke by themselves as the score moves, so the number that raises an alert in the detection estate is the number that closes an application. Most products in this research either compute a score they cannot enforce on, or enforce on rules a model never touched; Trend does both in one path. Private access rules pair with the same risk engine to give graduated mid-session responses rather than a single disconnection. The operational layer around that is even. Rule enforcement is recorded per user and per device, with the rule name leading through to its own configuration. Application onboarding starts from the subdomains and addresses users actually requested over a fourteen-day window, with the users involved and the user groups worth creating. Compliance coverage runs to ISO, CSA STAR, IRAP, ISMAP, TX-RAMP, and SOC 3, with ZTSA Private Access in scope.

An organization already running Vision One is the one this is shaped for. The Secure Access Module installs through the Endpoint Security Agent that is already on those endpoints, private access appears as one more service in a console the security team keeps open, and the score driving the access rules is computed from telemetry the same platform is collecting anyway, which is the part a standalone access product cannot reproduce. A service provider is served by the same console, through predefined and custom roles built from a permissions matrix with read-only, full and partial states, a per-app scope tab, and a company scope confining an administrator to named customer accounts or groups.

Reachability is a matter of deployment rather than of a gate. The connector arrangement is the whole of the protection, since no cryptographic authorization stands in front of a connector, no primitive is named for one, and there is no defined behaviour for refusing an unauthorized packet, so what a connector is exposed to follows from where it was placed. The User Portal has the same shape, delivering HTTPS along with web-based RDP and SSH but no clipboard control, content restriction or recording, and leaving WebSocket traffic unaddressed. The programmatic surface stops at the product boundary as well. Vision One offers a versioned API across several areas and a Terraform provider in the registry, but neither reaches the Zero Trust Secure Access objects, so private applications, connectors and access rules are created and changed one at a time in the console. Post-quantum cryptography does not reach the access path, and agentic AI access is unaddressed.

A security team that has already made Vision One its detection and response platform is extending something it operates rather than buying a product to sit beside it, and a risk score moving policy while a session is open is the clearest version of that idea in this research. What comes with it is an access layer whose protection is positional rather than cryptographic, and whose objects are reachable only by hand. An organization that wants its access estate built from code, or that needs a session on an unmanaged device controlled once it is open rather than only permitted, will want to weigh how much of that work stays manual. A buyer with a post-quantum requirement is likely to want more than this offers.

Foundation Builders

Foundation Builders is where the market’s operational heritage lives. The vendors here reached zero-trust access from somewhere else—application delivery, VPN concentrators, network access control, endpoint resilience, data security, regional networking—and their products carry that lineage as both their strength and their boundary. The strengths are operational: mature diagnostics that name the rule that decided, disciplined endpoint-agent management across UEM platforms, customer-hosted deployment models that answer residency questions by construction, and migration machinery built for the installed bases these vendors already own. The boundaries are equally characteristic: thinner automation surfaces, point-in-time rather than continuous risk evaluation in several cases, and convergence stories that depend on another vendor’s product or on adjacent modules. The buyer here runs an estate that must keep working through the transition, whether that means a workforce moving off a VPN, a contractor population to govern, or a regulated deployment that must remain in-country. This buyer values predictability over novelty.

Brown Money
Vendor
Access Provisioning Automation Depth
Access Troubleshooting and Diagnostics
Endpoint Agent Manageability
Identity Provider Integration Depth
Multi-Tenant and Distributed Org Management
OT and Non-Standard Endpoint Coverage
Session Reliability and Failover
VPN Migration Tooling
Average
Absolute Security3.02.55.02.53.0—4.53.02.9
Check Point3.53.54.03.04.02.54.53.03.5
Citrix3.55.04.04.02.53.04.54.53.9
Forcepoint3.02.03.53.03.01.02.51.02.4
Genians4.03.52.52.53.01.02.52.52.7
InstaSafe2.02.52.52.02.02.51.01.01.9
Ivanti4.04.03.51.53.53.02.55.03.4
Skyhigh Security2.53.53.52.03.02.04.04.03.1
Teldat3.02.52.02.02.01.02.02.02.1
Green Money
Vendor
Application Discovery and Onboarding
Automation and Orchestration API
Clientless Access Architecture
Connector and Relay Architecture
Policy Engine Architecture
SSE/SASE Platform Integration
Single Packet Authorization
Average
Absolute Security2.01.0—1.52.53.52.01.8
Check Point2.02.02.53.54.03.03.02.9
Citrix3.01.54.03.53.53.03.53.1
Forcepoint2.01.52.52.01.53.53.02.3
Genians2.02.01.01.53.02.02.01.9
InstaSafe1.01.01.52.02.01.03.51.7
Ivanti3.02.52.52.53.01.03.02.5
Skyhigh Security2.52.02.54.02.03.53.02.8
Teldat2.02.51.02.53.03.02.52.4
GRCS
Vendor
Access Audit Trail and Forensics
Continuous Session Risk Evaluation
Data Residency and Sovereignty Controls
Regulatory Compliance Mapping
Service Resilience and Availability
Supply Chain and Infrastructure Security
Third-Party and Contractor Access Governance
Zero Trust Architecture Integrity
Average
Absolute Security3.52.53.02.02.03.01.52.52.5
Check Point2.52.04.02.53.03.02.52.02.7
Citrix4.54.03.02.53.53.04.03.53.5
Forcepoint2.51.03.02.53.02.52.52.52.4
Genians2.04.04.01.53.02.51.52.52.6
InstaSafe2.51.51.51.02.01.53.53.52.1
Ivanti3.04.04.02.53.53.02.53.03.2
Skyhigh Security2.54.52.53.04.02.52.53.03.1
Teldat2.52.52.02.52.51.51.53.02.3
Emerging Tech
Vendor
AI-Driven Policy Automation
Quantum-Resistant Cryptography
Unified ZTNA and SSE Convergence
Universal ZTNA for OT/IoT
ZTNA for Agentic AI Workloads
Average
Absolute Security2.0—3.5—2.01.5
Check Point2.01.03.02.01.01.8
Citrix4.02.51.52.01.02.2
Forcepoint1.01.03.51.01.01.5
Genians1.01.01.51.01.01.1
InstaSafe1.01.01.02.01.01.2
Ivanti2.51.01.02.01.01.5
Skyhigh Security1.04.54.52.01.02.6
Teldat1.52.02.51.01.01.6

Absolute Security

Absolute Secure Access

Challenger | Foundation Builders | Fast Following

Summary:

Absolute Secure Access is a VPN-lineage remote access product that has been extended with ZTNA policy rather than built as a zero-trust platform from the ground up. It is bought as a Secure Access Server, customer-hosted on Windows Server or taken as the Absolute-operated Secure Access Cloud, paired with the Secure Access client, which is the only access path the product offers. Several capabilities this research touches sit in adjacent SKUs that must be licensed separately: Secure Web Gateway for web inspection, Absolute Insights for Network for telemetry and application visibility, and Absolute Resilience for the firmware-embedded Persistence feature that reinstalls a damaged client without IT involvement.

Assessment:

Absolute’s strongest work is on the client itself. Deployment paths cover Intune and Workspace ONE, client properties are settable key by key, support runs to the current and the previous version, and a user can generate a diagnostic report without help from an administrator. The access audit trail is the other strong result, covering thirty-one record types field by field, with destination-agnostic export to syslog and Splunk.

Organizations running a tightly managed fleet get the most here. Tunnels heal themselves and survive network loss without re-authentication, an availability commitment with credits as the remedy stands behind the service, and a client damaged on an endpoint is reinstalled from firmware without an administrator touching it. Endpoint durability and connection survivability are what Absolute competes on, and a fleet already enrolled in Intune or Workspace ONE is where that pays.

One architectural decision accounts for most of the limits. Every access path runs through the installed client, with no clientless portal, no browser-rendered RDP or SSH, and no agentless route of any kind, which leaves the clientless path, non-standard and OT endpoints, and universal ZTNA for OT and IoT with nothing to assess, and constrains third-party access because a contractor cannot be onboarded without deploying the agent first. Automation is the second constraint. There is no REST or GraphQL interface, no CLI, and no infrastructure-as-code provider for Secure Access policy management, and the WebControl API reaches users, groups and devices but not applications or policy, so nothing about the policy set can be driven from outside the console. Application discovery stops at the same edge, where the insights dashboards show observed destinations but offer no path to promote one into a policy object. Cryptography is classical only, which leaves quantum resistance the one clear outlier. The Secure Access Server is customer-hosted and takes inbound connections, and that is what limits both the connector and relay design and the integrity of the zero-trust path. Compliance coverage is limited by scope rather than absence, since the FedRAMP authorization and the ISO certificate name the sibling Secure Endpoint suite rather than Secure Access itself.

Platform breadth is what Absolute trades away. Endpoint manageability and connection survivability are as strong here as anywhere in this research, and for a managed fleet on a hosted or customer-run Secure Access Server that covers most of the requirement; the cost is a client-only access path, a policy set that has to be built by hand in the console, and web inspection, telemetry and self-repair each sitting behind a separate SKU. Organizations that need to reach unmanaged devices, onboard a contractor without installing software first, or author access policy from a pipeline are likely to want more than this offers.

Check Point

SASE Private Access

Challenger | Foundation Builders | Fast Following

Summary:

Check Point SASE is the Perimeter 81 acquisition rebuilt onto Check Point’s Infinity Portal, and it is bought that way: an Infinity tenant, a SASE subscription, and the SASE Agent on managed endpoints. Traffic reaches cloud gateways across seventy-four points of presence in four regions. Private applications are published either through a WireGuard Connector installed with a token-bearing command or through a Harmony Connect Docker container that builds a reverse tunnel outbound, and agentless applications covering HTTP/S, RDP, SSH and VNC are reached from a browser portal with no client at all. Two components that carry weight in this research sit outside the core purchase: the Enterprise Browser built with Surf Security, and the Quantum Rugged and IoT Protect lines for industrial estates.

Assessment:

Check Point’s strength is what it commits to contractually. The terms of service commit to 99.999% monthly availability for SASE Private Access, with service credits as the stated remedy, conditioned on a two-zone, two-gateway, two-region deployment, which makes session reliability and failover its leading result. The policy engine is close behind, combining group, date and time, IP and country location, browser and OS conditions through explicit match-all and match-some logic, backed by a platform-wide device posture component that checks antivirus, firewall, OS version, files, registry, processes and disk encryption. Data residency is selectable across five regions governing the management plane, policy, logs, and reports.

Organizations already inside the Infinity Portal get the most here. An Infinity parent tenant creates child SASE tenants, each with its own primary administrator, with inherited administrative access and per-child usage and billing at the parent, which is a genuine hierarchy rather than a cross-tenant dashboard. The agent is managed with the tools such organizations already run, with Intune and Jamf handled directly alongside named support for Meraki, SCCM, MobileIron, and AirWatch, and MSI properties and configuration keys available for scripted installation. Together they describe a product built to be administered alongside other Check Point services rather than run on its own.

The limits trace back to what the product is, which is Perimeter 81’s access engine under Check Point’s console. Cloud gateways make and enforce the access decision in the same place, the components do not authenticate one another in the control plane, and the connector has to be reachable, so the architecture does not hold the separation that the strictest products in this market do. Adjudication is periodic rather than continuous: posture is checked on a twenty-, forty- or sixty-minute schedule or at connection only, and the agentless path takes no posture input and does not re-evaluate mid-session at all. Automation carries the same inheritance, with the public API still the Perimeter 81 specification on SwaggerHub, broad across networks, gateways and tunnels but incomplete on applications and policy, no vendor Terraform provider in any registry, and application onboarding manual throughout. Post-quantum cryptography and agentic AI access are unaddressed.

The result is a mid-market offer from a large security incumbent, and the incumbent’s machinery is the strongest part of it: an availability commitment with credits behind it, tenancy that bills, and endpoint management that meets an estate where it already is. The access architecture and the automation surface are where the acquired product still shows through. Buyers who need decision and enforcement genuinely separated, adjudication that continues through a session, or an estate driven from infrastructure as code will want to weigh that inheritance carefully.

Citrix

Citrix Secure Private Access

Leader | Foundation Builders | Fast Following

Summary:

Citrix Secure Private Access is a zero-trust access service built on decades of application-delivery engineering, available as a Citrix Cloud service or an on-premises edition. A deployment pairs the Connector Appliance, available for VMware ESXi, Hyper-V, Nutanix AHV and XenServer or as marketplace images for Azure, AWS and Google Cloud, with the Citrix Secure Access client for TCP and UDP applications, and reaches web and SaaS applications agentlessly through the browser. Several capabilities credited here are adjacent services on the same platform rather than part of the base: the Device Posture service, Adaptive Authentication, Remote Browser Isolation, Citrix Enterprise Browser and Citrix Analytics for Security. Citrix has retired its own internet-security service, and internet access is now delegated to an integrated Google Chrome Enterprise Premium.

Assessment:

Citrix’s strength is the account it keeps of an access session. Diagnostic logs name the user, the application and the specific access policies triggered, with info codes and descriptions attached, and Device Posture transactions report expected against actual for every check. A hop-by-hop latency report covers the delivery path, and Kafka, syslog and OData exports carry all of it to a SIEM. The same logs anchor the audit record, alongside a SystemLog API for audit events and Citrix Analytics SIEM exports. Sessions hold up under infrastructure trouble as well, on a Citrix Cloud SLA that names Secure Private Access explicitly, with PoPs that mark themselves down and clients that reconnect elsewhere automatically.

Organizations reaching browser-based work on devices they do not manage get the most here. Agentless web access via DNS redirection carries per-application controls for clipboard use, printing, downloads, and screen capture, along with user and IP watermarking. If a policy requires these restrictions on a kiosk or personal device without Enterprise Browser, the session automatically falls back to Remote Browser Isolation. Access for third parties and contractors runs on the same machinery, with periodic thirty-minute posture scans that downgrade access mid-session, session termination and block-listing, and recorded sessions through the adjacent analytics SKU. A computed user risk score is selectable directly as an access-policy condition, across preset and custom tiers.

The limits are strategic rather than technical, and convergence costs the most. With Citrix Secure Internet Access retired, there is no Citrix secure web gateway or CASB for private-access policy objects to be shared with, and joining private and internet access under one policy now depends on another vendor’s product. Automation stops at a similar edge: the REST API covers applications and policies competently, but it carries no version identifier and no infrastructure-as-code provider, leaving access configuration to be scripted against an unversioned surface rather than declared alongside the rest of an estate. Delegated administration offers four built-in roles, with no custom-role capability and no scoping construct to confine an administrator to part of the estate. The compliance position rests on the certifications Citrix holds, with no requirement-by-requirement control mapping behind them.

Citrix Secure Private Access is an application-delivery company’s ZTNA service, strongest where a session has to be watched, restricted and explained, and thinnest where private access has to meet the rest of a security stack. An organization whose hardest access problem is devices it does not manage and parties it does not employ is well served. An organization wanting private and internet access governed as one policy under one vendor, infrastructure-as-code control over its access configuration, or administrative scoping across many business units is likely to want more than this offers.

Forcepoint

Forcepoint ONE ZTNA

Challenger | Foundation Builders | Slow Following

Summary:

Forcepoint ZTNA is not sold as a standalone product. It is a capability inside Forcepoint Data Security Cloud SSE, the platform formerly called Forcepoint ONE and itself built on the Bitglass acquisition, and it arrives alongside CASB, secure web gateway and the data-protection engine that is Forcepoint’s real centre of gravity. A deployment installs the ZTNA connector as an OVA on VMware ESXi or via a deployment script on CentOS or RHEL, with guidance to run at least two for redundancy. Access then splits along a hard architectural line: agentless access is HTTP and HTTPS only, reached as app tiles from the user portal, while SSH, RDP, SMB and SFTP require the SmartEdge Agent.

Assessment:

Forcepoint’s strength is platform coherence rather than access depth. CASB, secure web gateway and both ZTNA modes are administered from one console over shared objects, so the same user and group identities and the same device profiles govern all three. Endpoint agent management is the second strength, with UEM procedures for Intune, AirWatch, MobileIron, Jamf Pro and Workspace ONE and a silent install. The commercial commitments are firm as well: the public Cloud Services SLA commits Private Access to 99.999% with a credit schedule, and the status page carries 246 components including a dedicated ZTNA entry with ninety-day uptime and a retained incident history.

Buyers who already run Forcepoint for data protection get the most here. The data-protection policy that governs web and SaaS traffic applies to private traffic too, so a rule written once reaches an internal application behind the ZTNA connector on the same terms as a sanctioned SaaS tenant, and that private access is covered by the same SLA and the same status page as the rest of the platform. This is the product’s distinguishing claim, and it is what an organization treating data as the primary control is buying.

The decision to make agentless access web-only propagates through everything that limits the access layer. Agentless access is HTTP and HTTPS only, and no browser-delivered RDP, SSH, or VNC exists to reach a host that cannot run the SmartEdge Agent, which leaves non-standard and OT endpoints and universal ZTNA for OT and IoT with nothing to assess. Session risk is settled once, at access time, on group, device, location, host app and host network, with no posture re-read interval, identity change subscription or external risk feed to revisit it while the session is open. The programmatic surface is a Bitglass-heritage endpoint for users and groups plus a log-export API, with no endpoints for applications, policy or connector lifecycle and no provider in any registry, so every application is authored by hand and a migration from an existing VPN is done the same way. The policy condition set has no time control and no cross-condition operator model, troubleshooting records allow or deny without naming the rule that decided, and the architecture behind the availability commitments is thinner than the commitments themselves.

What this produces is a data-security platform with access attached rather than an access platform with data controls added to it. The convergence is real, one console and one data policy across CASB, web and private traffic, and the commercial terms behind it are explicit; the access layer underneath is comparatively shallow, split between a web-only agentless path and an agent for everything else, with policy built by hand and the decision taken once at the door. Organizations that need to reach OT or unmanaged hosts through a browser, re-evaluate risk during a session, or drive access policy from a pipeline may find this thinner than they need.

Genians

Genian ZTNA

Challenger | Foundation Builders | Fast Following

Summary:

Genian ZTNA is a network access control product that has grown a zero-trust remote-access tier, and the NAC heritage shapes everything about it. A deployment centres on the Genian ZTNA Policy Server, which can be installed in the customer’s own datacenter or cloud using the AWS Marketplace image, or hosted as a private site in the Genians Cloud. The deployment also includes Network Sensors for passive discovery, a ZTNA Gateway running on Ubuntu under VMware, VirtualBox, XenServer, or a cloud instance, and the Genian ZTNA Agent with an embedded client on every endpoint. High availability is an active/standby appliance pair with a shared virtual IP.

Assessment:

Genians’ strength is posture, and it traces to the NAC lineage. Compliance monitoring begins at connection and continues throughout, agent plugins run on configurable intervals, the agent notifies the policy server on change, and the responses are graded rather than binary, reaching from reduced privileges to endpoint isolation or redirection to a captive portal. Provisioning is close behind, combining scheduled directory synchronization from LDAP, Active Directory, an RDBMS, CSV, Google Workspace or REST with a User Account Request feature whose expiry field is purpose-built for visitors and outsourced personnel. Troubleshooting runs from a centralized log view with saved filters, real-time monitoring and first-match policy attribution, and multi-tenancy rests on custom roles with a scoping construct.

An operator who owns the endpoints and answers to a residency requirement gets the most here. Every component can sit in the customer’s own datacenter or cloud account, with each data category in a known location, and the hosted alternative offers regions across seven cloud providers with a sub-processor list naming countries. Set against continuous posture assessment on a fleet the organization already manages, the shape of the product is a NAC deployment extended to remote users rather than a service consumed from outside.

Two decisions account for the constraints. Every access path requires the Genian agent with its embedded client, and there is no browser-delivered route to a private application, which leaves non-standard and OT endpoints, the clientless path and universal ZTNA for OT and IoT with little or nothing to assess, and limits third-party access despite good guest-approval and expiry machinery, because the outside party still has to install software first. The gateway is the second decision: it requires one or more public IP addresses and takes client connections directly, so the connector and relay design does not reach the outbound-only model most of this market offers. Convergence is limited rather than absent, since Genian 6.0 added a Secure Web Gateway (Proxy) for URL-based application control inside the product, giving access policy an adjacent inspection service to sit beside, but no shared console or common object model spans access and web policy, and the line includes neither CASB nor DLP. Compliance rests on a current ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Certificate of Registration from G-CERTI, numbered GIS-7568-IC and valid to November 2028, scoped to the information protection system for network security software development and supply; no mapping to the frameworks a buyer is audited against accompanies it, and the most recent attestation beyond that certificate dates from 2020.

Genian ZTNA is a network access control platform with a remote-access tier attached, and it is strongest where those two traditions meet. Continuous posture evaluation, graded enforcement, guest and contractor expiry, and a deployment the customer places wherever residency demands describe a product built to keep watching a fleet it already manages. Reaching a device the agent cannot be installed on, presenting one console for access and web policy, and dialling out from the gateway rather than exposing it on a public address are the things the architecture does not do. Organizations needing browser-only access for contractors or OT hosts, an outbound-only connector, or a converged SSE stack might need to consider a product designed around access first.

InstaSafe

InstaSafe ZTNA (ZTAA)

Challenger | Foundation Builders | Fast Following

Summary:

InstaSafe ZTAA is one of the few products here built to the Cloud Security Alliance’s software-defined perimeter specification rather than around a reverse proxy, and its architecture follows that lineage, pairing agents with InstaSafe-hosted controllers that act as policy decision points and customer-deployed gateways that act as enforcement points behind drop-all firewall rules. Gateways are Ubuntu virtual machines on AWS, Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud, Hyper-V, QEMU, VirtualBox or VMware, and come in five types covering TCP, RDP, Network, VPN, and Agentless, each sized at roughly a thousand concurrent users. The product line also includes a Gov-Edition and an on-prem IdSec Enterprise variant that places the whole stack, including the PKI server, inside customer infrastructure. InstaSafe competes at the value end of the market, primarily in India and adjacent regions.

Assessment:

InstaSafe’s strength is architectural. The agent sends a single authorization packet before any TCP session exists, unknown clients are dropped by firewall rule, and protected infrastructure is hidden from the internet rather than proxied. Controllers and gateways run as separate planes, and gateways are installed alongside the applications they protect. Third-party and contractor access rests on the same foundation, delivered agentlessly through the browser to web, RDP and SSH applications, with per-resource user assignment, time-based access policies and session recording carried in the audit trail.

Organizations willing to run the enforcement layer themselves get the most here. Gateways are customer-deployed virtual machines placed in whichever cloud or hypervisor already hosts the applications, the IdSec Enterprise variant moves the whole stack including the PKI server inside customer infrastructure, and a Gov-Edition covers public-sector constraints, which together describe a product built to be operated rather than subscribed to. The clearest fit is a cost-sensitive buyer in India or an adjacent region whose immediate problem is giving employees and contractors scoped access to internal web, RDP and SSH systems without putting those systems on the internet.

There is no programmatic interface to the platform. No REST API, CLI, SDK, or infrastructure-as-code provider sits behind the console, so there is nothing to drive access changes from outside it. The same limitation affects onboarding and migration off a VPN. Every user, application, gateway, and access rule must be created by hand, with no bulk path or discovery mechanism to surface applications the buyer has not already inventoried. Redundancy is a second gateway holding the same configuration, with no failure detection and no automatic movement of traffic, and applications become unstable when one of several gateways fails. Posture is a pre-access gate across seventeen attributes, so a device that falls out of compliance mid-session keeps the access it was granted. Residency is not a control the customer selects, no hosting geography is fixed for the InstaSafe-hosted controllers, and the platform carries no named compliance certification.

Put together, InstaSafe is a software-defined perimeter implementation with a strong enforcement design and a thin operational layer around it: the packet-level gate, the hidden estate and the separated planes are real, and nearly everything around them is entered by hand in a console. An organization that needs access changes driven from its own pipelines, applications discovered rather than enumerated one at a time, gateway failover it does not have to watch, or workloads pinned to a named jurisdiction may find this thinner than it needs.

Ivanti

Ivanti Neurons for Zero Trust Access

Challenger | Foundation Builders | Fast Following

Summary:

Ivanti Neurons for Zero Trust Access is the cloud-managed successor to the Pulse Secure line. The Controller is hosted by Ivanti and acts as the policy decision point, while ZTA Gateways are customer-deployed headless virtual machines available for vSphere, AWS via CloudFormation, Azure, Google Cloud, Oracle Cloud, and KVM or OpenStack, grouped for high availability at each application location. Access runs only through the Ivanti Secure Access Client. One capability credited here comes from a named sibling SKU: HTML5 clientless access from Ivanti Connect Secure. Risk scoring is first-party, with a UEBA threat score computed inside nZTA from anomalous location, out-of-hours access, non-compliant devices and activity deviations.

Assessment:

Ivanti’s strength is moving an existing VPN estate onto ZTNA. A built-in application discovery policy routes unlisted applications to a default gateway for packet analysis and exposes the results through the API using discovered and non-discovered filter values. This allows applications absent from the configured inventory to be identified from live client traffic rather than loaded from a list. The same machinery supports bulk definition through the policies endpoint and CSV uploads of allowed domains. Diagnostics run to a similar depth. Every record carries message ID, severity, session ID, gateway ID and name, source IP, username and device ID, with active session views, retained gateway performance trends and RFC 5424 syslog streaming in JSON or WELF.

Organizations that want the data path to stay on infrastructure they own get the most here. The control plane is regionalized, with distinct addresses for North America, Canada, Europe, APJ and UAE, and all user data traverses only the customer-deployed Gateway. Access provisioning automation and continuous session risk evaluation carry comparable depth, the latter on continuous device posture assessment that Ivanti brands CARTA, where posture is reassessed against the current policy set and administrator policy changes take effect on established sessions. Service providers and distributed organizations are served by the MSP Portal, whose Add New Tenant workflow issues tenant-scoped administrator credentials confining an administrator to a named subset of tenants, with an All Tenants panel and cross-tenant usage reporting alongside it.

Access runs through the client by design, and the limits follow from that boundary. End users authenticate through the Ivanti Secure Access Client and never reach applications directly, so the browser-only path comes from the adjacent SKU: Ivanti Connect Secure, configurable as an nZTA Gateway under the same Unified Access License, provides clientless RDP and SSH with credential passing and session recording, though that proxy path does not carry WebSocket or HTTP/2. Access for third parties and contractors turns on expiry, and there is none to set; no secure access policy carries a validity window or a bounded grant duration, and an idle timeout is not a grant expiry. Identity is the most constrained operational result. Authentication services cover local users and SAML federation, but nothing synchronises users and groups from a directory independently of login and there is no SCIM endpoint, so entitlements are read from the assertion each time a user signs in. Convergence with the wider stack has nothing to attach to, since Ivanti offers no secure web gateway, CASB or DLP service for the access policy to share objects with.

For an existing Pulse Secure or Ivanti customer with the client already on its endpoints, this is the shortest route off a VPN, and the discovery, diagnostic and posture machinery is engineered around that move rather than bolted on after it. An organization that needs a browser-only path as a first-class route, time-bounded grants for outside parties, directory-driven provisioning through SCIM, or private and internet access governed under one vendor’s policy is likely to want more than this offers.

Skyhigh Security

Skyhigh Private Access

Challenger | Foundation Builders | Fast Following

Summary:

Skyhigh Private Access is the ZTNA function of the Skyhigh Security Service Edge platform, the McAfee Enterprise and Trellix lineage now sold as a standalone SSE business, and it is bought as part of that platform. A deployment uses the Skyhigh Client Proxy, the same endpoint software that steers secure web gateway and cloud firewall traffic. Secure App Connectors are deployed beside private applications as a VMware OVA, an AWS AMI with or without a CloudFormation template, an Azure image, or a Docker container. They are grouped into active/active connector groups with an n+1 sizing rule. Private Access Gateways sit within a large point-of-presence estate. A reverse-proxy Clientless Access path serves unmanaged devices over HTTPS, with agentless, web-native RDP and SSH.

Assessment:

Skyhigh’s strength is that private access is governed by the platform’s policy rather than by a policy of its own. A single policy engine spans all platform components behind one policy interface, a parameter belonging to one component such as CASB is usable with another, and DLP objects written for web and cloud traffic are reused on private-application traffic. The client proxy attaches real-time posture metadata to requests, and Allow with DLP, Allow with Web Policy and Isolate are available as graduated actions on private-application traffic, so a private application can be reached under an inspection rule rather than only permitted or refused. Post-quantum protection reaches further here than in most of this research. Private Access tunnel segments enable quantum-safe TLS 1.3 by default from June 2025, all Private Access traffic traverses the Secure Channel, and post-quantum key exchange is negotiated at each encrypted hop. The operational layer is steady, with active/active connector groups load-balanced per connection across availability zones, GeoDNS resolution to the nearest point of presence, and egress-only connectors in five deployment form factors.

An organization that already buys the Skyhigh SSE platform gets the most here. The endpoint software steering private access is the Client Proxy that is already steering secure web gateway and cloud firewall traffic, so there is no second agent to place on a device, and the DLP and CASB objects a data-security team has already written apply to private applications without being rewritten for them. Connectors go beside the applications in whichever of the five form factors the estate runs, and unmanaged devices reach web applications, RDP and SSH through the reverse proxy without a connector of their own, which brings an outside population inside the same inspection rules.

Authentication is the sharpest limit. Private Access accepts generic SAML 2.0 and nothing else, with no OIDC option and no per-provider integration, and no SCIM provisioning, which leaves user and group records to be maintained by hand. Neither the authentication method nor MFA state is available as a policy condition, so a rule cannot ask how a user proved who they were. The policy vocabulary is narrow in the same way, running to six rule criteria despite good third-party posture ingestion. Automation stops at the product boundary rather than at a coverage boundary, since the platform offers a versioned API across eleven areas, none of which addresses Private Access objects, and there is no vendor Terraform provider in any registry, leaving the access layer to be configured by hand inside a platform that is otherwise scriptable. The clientless broker reaches OT hosts over RDP and SSH, but there is no industrial connector form factor and no device identity beyond posture checks, no AI or machine learning reaches the policy path, and agentic AI access is unaddressed.

Skyhigh Private Access is the private-application leg of a data-security estate, and it behaves like one. One policy engine, DLP and CASB objects that carry across web, cloud and private traffic, graduated inspection actions on a private application, and post-quantum key exchange already on the tunnel are what buying the platform returns. Asked to work as an access layer in its own right, it is narrower, and an organization whose identity requirement runs past generic SAML, or that needs authentication strength or MFA state to bear on a decision, may find this thinner than it needs. Teams that manage access as code, or that need OT and IoT endpoints inside the same policy, will want to weigh how much of that sits outside the product’s reach.

Teldat

Teldat ZTNA

Challenger | Foundation Builders | Fast Following

Summary:

Teldat sells zero-trust access as a component of be.Safe Pro, the Spanish networking vendor’s SSE and SASE suite, alongside a secure web gateway and its Zero Trust SD-WAN line. The architecture has three parts: the be.Safe Agent installed on user devices, which builds tunnels to the platform and checks device compliance before access is granted; a ZTNA Connector deployed as a virtual image in the network segment where internal applications live; and a ZTNA Broker that terminates tunnels and evaluates per-session policy on user, device, context and risk, deployable in Teldat’s cloud or on the customer’s premises. Teldat competes regionally, largely in Spain and adjacent European markets.

Assessment:

Teldat’s strength is the shape of its access path. The connector sits inside the network segment holding the internal applications and establishes an outbound tunnel to the broker, and the agent tunnels outward from the device, so the application segment accepts no inbound connection from the access path. The broker then evaluates policy per session on user, device, context and risk, and the agent checks device compliance before access is granted. Teldat holds an ISO/IEC 27001:2022 certificate issued by IQNET under reference ES-SI-0084-2022, with the management system in place since 2022, which is more than several larger vendors here provide.

Organizations already buying Teldat networking get the most here. Zero-trust access arrives as one component of be.Safe Pro rather than as a separate procurement, with a single console covering zero-trust access alongside the secure web gateway, though users, groups, devices and applications are not held in one object model across the two, and the broker can run on the customer’s own premises for buyers who will not place the policy decision point in a vendor cloud. Regional buyers in Spain and adjacent European markets who want a local supplier operating a certified management system are the shape this product is built for.

The capabilities around those three components are real but stop short of depth. Directory integration synchronizes users and groups from Entra ID independently of login, on a cadence an administrator sets between one and ninety-nine minutes. Policy conditions are the strongest of them, spanning identity and group, device posture, network and location, time and session context, and risk, composed per session on a default-deny basis with least privilege applied per application. Destinations reached through the connector are surfaced for onboarding rather than every application being entered by hand, filterable and exportable logs record the authenticated user, the resource and the allow or deny outcome alongside a real-time session view, and per-session audit records name the authenticated user. Device posture is evaluated for the life of the tunnel rather than only at establishment, and the broker tears the tunnel down when it fails. Data-plane compute runs on OVHcloud regions across EMEA, APAC and Latin America with the United States excluded, though there is no customer-selectable region, and the connector reaches applications over arbitrary TCP on an egress-only footprint. The agent is managed from a central console that pushes security, connectivity and operational policy to Windows, Android, iOS and Linux endpoints, though there is no UEM deployment path and no administrator-driven update control. The outbound tunnel pattern has no cryptographic gate, primitive or protocol coverage behind it, so the single-packet property is a consequence of where the tunnels start rather than an authorization step of its own. Post-quantum work covers pre-shared post-quantum keys in IPsec and ML-KEM integrated into IKEv2 under a hybrid model, and because the ZTNA channels themselves run over IKEv2 a post-quantum key agreement is reachable on the access path; what is missing is a generally available status and a documented way to turn it on for that leg.

Teldat ZTNA is an access component inside a networking vendor’s SSE suite rather than a platform in its own right, with three well-shaped parts, a certified supplier behind them and a surrounding set of capabilities that work without going deep. An organization whose access programme turns on browser-delivered access for OT assets and other endpoints that cannot run the agent, a workload identity that can be named as a policy subject in its own right, or post-quantum protection it can turn on and verify on the access path rather than inherit, is likely to want more than this offers.

Agile Optimizers

Agile Optimizers is the most contested quadrant on this Radar, holding a third of the field. What unites its vendors is the buyer motion: an operational team modernizing access it already runs—replacing a VPN, consolidating point tools, extending posture control it has today—through steady, incremental delivery rather than an architectural rebuild. The range inside the quadrant is wide. At one end sit converged platforms iterating fast on unified policy engines, per-request adjudication, and included-rather-than-sold access proxies; at the other, deliberately narrow products that do one job—browser-rendered sessions, developer-friendly VPN replacement, last-mile performance—and decline to grow a platform around it. Several vendors here ship named MSP portals and cross-tenant administration, reflecting the channel through which much of the mid-market buys. The buyer is pragmatic: the evaluation question is not which architecture wins the decade, but which product improves the workflows already in production without disrupting them.

Brown Money
Vendor
Access Provisioning Automation Depth
Access Troubleshooting and Diagnostics
Endpoint Agent Manageability
Identity Provider Integration Depth
Multi-Tenant and Distributed Org Management
OT and Non-Standard Endpoint Coverage
Session Reliability and Failover
VPN Migration Tooling
Average
Accops3.52.52.52.52.02.02.51.52.4
AppGate3.54.53.54.53.01.54.05.03.7
Barracuda Networks3.02.53.54.03.51.52.53.02.9
Cloudbrink3.02.53.52.52.01.03.01.02.3
Cloudflare4.54.04.54.54.02.55.04.54.2
Ericsson2.02.01.52.04.02.54.02.52.6
Fortinet4.04.04.03.54.55.03.54.54.1
Microsoft5.04.02.55.03.02.04.55.03.9
Portnox3.02.53.03.02.02.52.01.02.4
SonicWall3.03.53.54.03.51.53.55.03.4
Twingate4.52.53.54.02.01.04.53.03.1
Green Money
Vendor
Application Discovery and Onboarding
Automation and Orchestration API
Clientless Access Architecture
Connector and Relay Architecture
Policy Engine Architecture
SSE/SASE Platform Integration
Single Packet Authorization
Average
Accops1.51.02.51.51.51.52.51.7
AppGate3.04.51.02.55.01.04.53.1
Barracuda Networks2.01.01.03.01.53.53.02.1
Cloudbrink1.51.0—3.51.52.54.02.0
Cloudflare2.55.03.54.55.04.53.04.0
Ericsson2.02.54.03.53.03.03.03.0
Fortinet2.03.52.51.54.04.54.53.2
Microsoft3.52.53.53.55.03.54.03.6
Portnox1.01.51.52.02.01.03.01.7
SonicWall3.03.51.53.55.02.53.53.2
Twingate2.03.5—4.54.52.53.52.9
GRCS
Vendor
Access Audit Trail and Forensics
Continuous Session Risk Evaluation
Data Residency and Sovereignty Controls
Regulatory Compliance Mapping
Service Resilience and Availability
Supply Chain and Infrastructure Security
Third-Party and Contractor Access Governance
Zero Trust Architecture Integrity
Average
Accops2.02.04.01.02.52.03.52.02.4
AppGate4.04.04.03.53.52.53.05.03.7
Barracuda Networks3.01.53.03.03.52.52.02.52.6
Cloudbrink2.02.51.01.02.51.01.53.51.9
Cloudflare4.54.04.04.55.03.04.54.04.2
Ericsson2.02.53.02.03.52.02.53.02.6
Fortinet4.54.54.53.54.53.54.52.54.0
Microsoft4.03.53.55.04.54.03.53.03.9
Portnox2.02.53.03.02.51.02.52.52.4
SonicWall3.54.03.52.53.03.53.03.53.3
Twingate3.02.52.51.53.51.52.03.52.5
Emerging Tech
Vendor
AI-Driven Policy Automation
Quantum-Resistant Cryptography
Unified ZTNA and SSE Convergence
Universal ZTNA for OT/IoT
ZTNA for Agentic AI Workloads
Average
Accops1.02.51.02.01.01.5
AppGate4.0——3.02.01.8
Barracuda Networks1.01.02.53.51.01.8
Cloudbrink1.01.02.5—1.01.1
Cloudflare2.54.54.52.55.03.8
Ericsson2.0—3.03.51.01.9
Fortinet2.02.54.04.52.03.0
Microsoft4.01.04.01.04.02.8
Portnox1.01.0—2.01.01.0
SonicWall2.01.03.01.02.51.9
Twingate——2.51.02.51.2

Accops

Accops HySecure

Challenger | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Accops HySecure is a customer-hosted ZTNA gateway with a broad application-publishing surface, sold as software the buyer installs rather than as a service the vendor operates. A deployment is assembled from the HySecure gateway, which runs on a hypervisor, on bare metal, or from images for AWS, Azure, Google Cloud and Oracle Cloud Infrastructure in standalone, two-node or multi-node cluster form, together with a web management console and a choice of desktop client, on-demand client or the clientless HyLite browser portal. Multi-factor authentication comes from the adjacent HyID SKU and replayable session recording from the HyWorks session-host module, so both are separate purchases.

Assessment:

Accops’ strength is that no Accops-operated cloud sits in the access path. Every component, the policy database included, is installed by the customer in a location of their choosing, which settles data residency by where the software goes rather than by contract. Contractor access is the second strength, built on HyLite’s clientless browser portal and aimed at vendors as much as at home-working employees, with clipboard and printing controls documented for the portal session itself, local accounts that avoid an employee-directory entry, and time-bounded access filters. Provisioning follows the same directory-driven model, where access control lists bind directory groups straight to application groups so a membership change takes effect at the next logon. The 7.3 release also carries quantum-resistant algorithms on the gateway-to-client and gateway-to-directory TLS legs, a shipping implementation most products in this research do not yet offer.

Organizations that want to own and run the access infrastructure themselves get the most here. HySecure is software the buyer installs and clusters, from a single node to a multi-node deployment, on their own hypervisor, bare metal or cloud account, so nothing in the access path belongs to Accops and nothing has to be consumed on a vendor’s terms. The broad publishing surface and the clientless portal between them cover a mixed estate of internal applications and outside users without a second access product, provided the buyer accepts multi-factor authentication and session recording arriving as the separate HyID and HyWorks purchases.

Automation is where the constraints concentrate. The only programmatic interface is an HRMS reporting API that returns login and logout records. There is no policy API, CLI, infrastructure-as-code provider, or vendor SDK. As a result, every application, rule, and discovery step must be created individually in the console. Migration from an existing VPN follows the same manual process. HySecure is a standalone gateway rather than a converged stack, which leaves ZTNA and SSE convergence and wider platform integration with little to draw on, and AI-driven policy automation and agentic AI access are unaddressed in the access path. The quantum-resistant work has edges of its own, carrying no NIST or IETF algorithm designation and not yet reaching the Workspace client. Compliance is the most straightforwardly addressable of these, with no attestation, certificate number or audit scope behind the certification it claims to hold.

For an organization whose requirement is a gateway it owns end to end, Accops answers it at the value end of the market: broad application publishing, a clientless path fit for contractors, residency decided by where the buyer installs the software, and quantum-resistant algorithms already shipping on two TLS legs. What comes with that is a console-driven operating model, in which policy, applications and any migration from a VPN are built by hand and there is nothing to script against. Teams that expect to drive access policy from a pipeline, or that want access converged with web and SaaS controls in one stack, will want to weigh that against the price.

AppGate

AppGate ZTNA

Leader | Agile Optimizers | Outpacing

Summary:

AppGate ZTNA is an architecturally orthodox software-defined perimeter and a deliberate pure-play: a zero-trust access product rather than a converged security platform. A deployment is a Collective assembled from discrete appliances the customer runs, comprising Controllers that hold configuration and make policy decisions, Gateways that enforce them, and a LogServer, available as hypervisor images, AWS, Azure and GCP marketplace instances, or hardware. An optional Portal appliance adds browser-based access and a headless client covers unattended systems. Two capabilities credited here are separately licensed and depend on the AppGate ZTP integration: Application Discovery, and the Risk Sentinel service behind risk-scored access.

Assessment:

AppGate’s strength is the integrity of the access architecture, and no other product in this research matches it. The Controller is a genuine policy decision point distinct from the Gateways that enforce, per-session microfirewalls are built from signed entitlement tokens, and every component is fronted by single packet authorization, so nothing accepts an unauthenticated connection. A Common Criteria Security Target and a NIST NCCoE reference build corroborate the design. The policy engine is equally strong, with claims-based conditions drawn from identity, device and context and sandboxed criteria scripts that can call an external service at sign-in and token renewal, an extensibility almost nothing else here offers. Single packet authorization itself and the automation API are close behind, the latter on a header-versioned REST API with a public OpenAPI specification and a vendor Terraform provider carrying thirty-five resources.

Organizations replacing a VPN estate get the most here. Application Discovery, licensed separately, analyses observed Gateway traffic and presents hostnames and user counts for administrator review before conversion into entitlements, which makes migration the third leading result. Risk handling is well developed. Risk-tier claims gate entitlement actions and trigger step-up interactions, and access conditions are re-evaluated on events, on a five-, fifteen- or sixty-minute cycle, or on a fixed schedule. CrowdStrike supplies the external risk signal mid-session. Availability is the weak point in that picture: the public AppGate-branded status page carries ninety days of per-service uptime history, and the recorded figure for the private-access endpoint sits below the availability commitment it accompanies. Together they describe a product built for a security team that wants the access layer done strictly and separately.

The remaining results are the direct cost of the pure-play strategy rather than execution gaps. No policy type in the product addresses web filtering, cloud application control or data inspection, so convergence and platform integration have nothing to draw on. Clientless access is the thinnest operational area: the Portal serves HTTPS applications only, with no AppGate-rendered RDP, SSH or VNC and no data-handling controls on portal sessions. That also limits what the product can reach on OT and other non-standard endpoints, despite a capable ruggedized Ax-M connector on the device side. Cryptography is classical-only across every leg, which makes post-quantum a roadmap question rather than an unknown.

The boundary is deliberate, and it cuts both ways. The access architecture is the most rigorous in this research, and web, cloud and data security have to be sourced elsewhere. A security team that wants private access built strictly, and that already owns the rest of the stack, is well served by that division of labour. Buyers looking for one platform to cover access alongside web and data, or for a browser path that reaches beyond HTTPS applications, may find the pure-play boundary limiting.

Barracuda Networks

Barracuda SecureEdge

Challenger | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Barracuda SecureEdge Access is the ZTNA component of a broader SSE platform aimed at the mid-market and at the managed service providers who serve it. It is sold in four tiers, DNS, Private, Internet and Premium, which determine whether ZTNA, DNS filtering, secure web gateway, firewall-as-a-service and content inspection are included. A deployment runs the SecureEdge Access Agent on every endpoint, Edge Services in Azure-hosted public points of presence or in a customer-dedicated Private PoP, and the SecureEdge Connector beside private applications, all administered from SecureEdge Manager. Buyers with industrial estates add Secure Connector appliances, which are separate hardware. A dedicated multi-tenant MSP portal is available.

Assessment:

Barracuda’s strength is identity plumbing. The product accepts up to ten identity providers concurrently, one provider can serve multiple workspaces, and inbound SCIM directories for Entra ID and Okta Workforce carry rotatable tokens, sync status and last-sync timestamps. Resilience is close behind, with Edge Services across nineteen Azure regions, per-PoP egress addresses, and a public status page carrying uptime history. Access also sits inside the platform rather than beside it, since the tier a customer buys turns DNS filtering, the secure web gateway, firewall-as-a-service and content inspection on in the same console and behind the same agent.

Managed service providers and the mid-market estates they run get the most here. The MSP portal spans multiple customer tenants with zero-touch remote deployment, cross-tenant reporting and an administrative audit log, and the tier structure means each tenant carries only the services it needs. Industrial sites are the other fit, and there the fit comes from hardware rather than software. The Secure Connector line ships in compact, DIN-rail and ruggedized form factors, enrolls with SecureEdge Manager as an IoT device, connects remote micro-networks over VPN and identifies industrial protocols. Few products in this research bring a purpose-built industrial form factor.

Every change to SecureEdge is a console action. There is no REST API, CLI or infrastructure-as-code provider behind SecureEdge Manager, so each policy, application and enrollment is entered by hand, and application onboarding, VPN cutover and access provisioning have no bulk or templated path through it. Policy is the second limit. Rules bind users or groups to applications with a device-posture tab, and there is no network-context condition or boolean composition, so a rule cannot express more than who is asking and what state their device is in. Session risk is handled by scheduled re-authentication and a posture gate at access time rather than by re-evaluation mid-session. The private-access path is agent-only, so a contractor has no browser route in and a host that cannot run the agent stays out of reach, notwithstanding the strength on the industrial device side. The availability commitment is 99.5%, under the level this research credits as a service-level guarantee.

Barracuda trades programmability for reach. Five services under one console and one agent, nineteen regions behind them, a multi-tenant portal for the provider running many customers at once, and industrial hardware few competitors offer describe a platform assembled for breadth and day-to-day manageability rather than for depth in any single dimension. What none of it offers is a way to work on the platform from outside its console. An organization that onboards applications in bulk, composes policy on network context, or expects access to be driven from code might need to consider a platform with a programmable surface behind it.

Cloudbrink

Cloudbrink Personal SASE

Challenger | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Cloudbrink Personal SASE is a software-only zero-trust access service built around last-mile performance for distributed workforces. A deployment has three parts: a Brink App on the endpoint, a fabric of FAST Edge points of presence between the user and the application, and a Brink Connector deployed beside the private applications. Connectors install on VMware ESXi, Hyper-V, Proxmox and Nutanix AHV on-prem, or from images in AWS and Azure, and up to sixty-four instances cluster into a single active-active group, with sessions redistributed onto the surviving members when one fails. Clients cover Windows, macOS, Linux, FreeBSD, iOS, Android and ChromeOS, and the whole deployment is administered from a single cloud portal. The product is agent-only by design, with no browser-delivered path.

Assessment:

Cloudbrink’s strength is the security of the access path. The connector makes outbound-only connections to published destination ports, so no inbound rule is needed at the customer site and nothing customer-side listens, and device authentication binds the endpoint’s serial ID and MAC address. The architecture behind it holds the same line: all five component channels run mutual TLS at TLS 1.3 only, with the control plane separated from the data plane, which few products here match. Certificates rotate automatically every eight hours, configurable per tenant, a genuine crypto-agility posture, though key agreement is not post-quantum and cryptography remains the weaker part of the same story. Device state carries weight alongside identity: posture is re-read on a configurable interval, a CrowdStrike integration reads the endpoint’s Falcon security score so that only devices above the threshold hold access, and a quarantine into a restricted resource template is available mid-session short of cutting the connection. Any number of identity providers can be configured on a tenant, each attached to a security group, with sign-in routed to the right one by email domain. Session records carry the user, the host, the timestamp and network statistics, with per-application analytics for throughput, latency, loss and jitter alongside them. The connector runs on six deployment targets with outbound-only communication throughout, and the endpoint agent is built to be operated, with silent-install commands for Windows, macOS and Linux, a one-action diagnostic bundle and a support CLI behind it. Session reliability comes from the sixty-four-instance active-active group, from three edges per agent with one active and two standby, from a control plane spread across availability zones and from cross-datacenter failover, though TCP connections terminate when an instance is lost, so sessions over SSH or FTP reconnect.

Distributed workforces on unreliable last-mile connections get the most here. Deployment is a question of where software goes rather than what has to be bought and sized: the connector runs wherever the applications already run, across four hypervisors and two clouds, and clustering to sixty-four instances lets that grow without a redesign. Seven client platforms, one endpoint agent and a single cloud portal describe a product built to be rolled out quickly and subscribed to rather than engineered into an estate.

Cloudbrink is an agent-only product, and that one decision accounts for most of what it cannot reach. Access requires the Brink App on the endpoint, or a router running it as the default gateway for devices that cannot host it, so there is no browser-delivered access at all, OT and IoT zones and other non-standard endpoints get nothing shaped for them, and a contractor or third party has to be brought onto a device running the agent before their access can be governed. The operating model is the second limit. The only programmatic interface is a log-retrieval API, so policy cannot be driven from outside the portal, and applications are defined there one at a time, with no bulk import, CSV path or infrastructure-as-code provider to bring an existing VPN estate across. Residency and security process are the third. Data is processed primarily in the United States, and a buyer cannot choose otherwise or learn which sub-processors are involved, so a residency commitment cannot be met from the service as it stands. A flaw found in the agent has only general support to report it to, since the vendor operates no disclosure policy, advisory archive or product-security contact of its own, though a company of this size may handle reports that way in practice. SOC 2 and ISO 27001 are claimed, though neither carries a defined scope. Uptime rests on trust rather than contract, since nothing is committed on availability and past incidents are not on public record. A session, once granted, runs until the user or a posture check ends it, because neither its length nor a re-authentication interval can be set, and the strength of the sign-in behind it cannot be made a condition in a rule. Posture itself is re-read on a timer, so a group change, a lost entitlement or a revoked token waits for the next sweep rather than ending the session. What is recorded afterwards is thinner than what is enforced: the access record shows that a connection happened but not the rule that permitted it, and the log-retrieval API carries a level, a message and a timestamp, so a SIEM inherits none of the decision context.

The architectural discipline here runs ahead of the product's breadth. Nothing listens at the customer edge, every channel runs mutual TLS 1.3, certificates live eight hours, and a sixty-four-instance group survives the loss of members, all delivered as software with nothing to rack; for a distributed workforce on managed laptops, that is a well-built answer at the last mile. An organization with OT or IoT zones to reach, third parties on devices it does not manage, an access practice driven from code, or a residency commitment to meet is likely to want more than this offers.

Cloudflare

Cloudflare Zero Trust

Leader | Agile Optimizers | Outpacing

Summary:

Cloudflare Access is the ZTNA component of Cloudflare One, delivered from the same global network that carries the company’s CDN and DDoS business. A deployment needs an Access subscription, the free cloudflared connector, deployable via Docker, Kubernetes and Helm, AWS, Azure, GCP or Ansible, and optionally the WARP client for device-level enrolment. Adjacent Cloudflare One SKUs supply the rest of the platform: Gateway for secure web gateway, plus CASB, DLP and Browser Isolation. Two dependencies matter commercially: data residency comes from the Data Localization Suite, an enterprise add-on, and the Cloudflare Network Firewall requires Magic Transit or Cloudflare WAN.

Assessment:

Cloudflare’s strength is non-human access. Service tokens are a first-class non-human principal with configurable duration, refresh, revocation and expiry alerting; mTLS service credentials admit a workload from a customer-uploaded certificate authority with no identity provider account behind it; and MCP server portals ship with the server and tool registry standing in as the agent inventory. No other product in this research reaches as far into agentic access. Post-quantum protection is carried as far, with hybrid ML-KEM key agreement generally available on both ZTNA legs, over TLS 1.3 for clientless browser access and over MASQUE for the client, in a criterion most products here barely reach. The policy engine underneath takes the fullest rule vocabulary encountered here, spanning identity, SAML group and OIDC claim, posture, IP, country, mTLS common name, service tokens and user risk, composed through Include, Require and Exclude, with third-party posture providers wired in. A versioned API, a Terraform provider covering all four core objects across 168 released versions, and a read-only dashboard mode that forces changes through the API together keep configuration outside the console.

An organization consolidating web security and private access onto one platform gets the most here. Private access and the secure web gateway run on one policy engine, so a rule written once governs both, and the connector fits the way such an organization already runs software, with Kubernetes and Helm support and replica load balancing across cloudflared instances. Resilience comes from the network rather than from the access product, with the full address range announced from every data centre by BGP, denial-of-service traffic absorbed at scale, and announcements withdrawn from a data centre that fails. A trust hub lists thirteen named attestations. Contractors and third parties are handled without a directory entry at all, reaching SSH, VNC and RDP rendered in the browser after a one-time PIN login.

Cloudflare does not hide the estate it protects. Public hostnames answer before authentication, which is inherent to the reverse-proxy model rather than an oversight, so an evaluation that requires an unadvertised service will not find one here. Onboarding is hand-worked, with applications added one at a time and no configuration path to the discovery feature from the portal. Industrial estates are the clearer gap, since there is no industrial protocol handling and no OT reference architecture, so an OT or IoT zone gets nothing shaped for it.

Cloudflare Zero Trust is one service with many features rather than a set of products introduced to each other, delivered from the network that already carries the company’s other business. That is what carries the newest criteria in this research, and an organization buying private access, web security, data protection and isolation as a single decision, with machine and agent identities standing alongside human ones, is served about as well as this market allows. An organization that needs its private services unreachable until a user has authenticated is likely to want more than a reverse proxy offers, and an industrial estate, with protocols and endpoints that are neither browsers nor managed laptops, may find this thinner than it needs. Buyers with a large application estate to bring across will want to weigh how much of that onboarding is done by hand, and to price the platform as a whole, since residency arrives with the Data Localization Suite as an enterprise add-on and the network firewall only with Magic Transit or Cloudflare WAN.

Ericsson

Ericsson NetCloud ZTNA

Challenger | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Ericsson NetCloud ZTNA is the zero trust access service of NetCloud SASE, bought as a per-user license on a NetCloud Manager subscription rather than as a product of its own. Two prerequisites shape every deployment: Secure Connect first, then an external SAML 2.0 identity provider. The application side is assembled from the NetCloud Exchange Service Gateway, on Azure, AWS, KVM, and VMware or as a preloaded appliance rated to 4 Gbps, the NetCloud Virtual Edge software connector, and Ericsson Cradlepoint routers acting as connectors for whatever sits behind them. Users come in through the NetCloud Client or a clientless browser portal. Hybrid Mesh Firewall, SD-WAN, and AIOps are separately licensed services on the same platform. Ericsson aims the product at cellular-first estates, in vehicles, IoT deployments, and distributed sites, rather than at cloud-first office workers.

Assessment:

The clientless portal is the widest surface in the product. Named RDP, SSH, HTTP, HTTPS, and VNC resources are reachable from a browser with no client or plugin. Web resources open inside a Remote Browser Isolation session. Sign-on boundary domains, capped at ten, determine which subdomains and linked sites a session may follow. Resources are presented per user and portal connections logged per user, which is what lets one path serve vendors, contractors and suppliers alongside remote employees. It pairs with the choice that sets the product apart: Ericsson Cradlepoint routers place otherwise unprotected devices into trust segments and act as ZTNA connectors, so IoT and OT assets that cannot host an agent are reachable per named resource without a separate appliance in front of them, the router dialling outbound and nothing listening at the site.

The infrastructure underneath is the second strength. The connector tier spans four service gateway deployment targets plus a hardware appliance carrying up to four thousand concurrent tunnels, and moves TCP, UDP, and ICMP rather than web protocols alone. Sites pair two routers under VRRP with WAN Verify for automatic failover, and the client reconnects on its own, holding reconnection open through mobile roaming. Nine points of presence are named by city and mapped to four management instances across the United States, Germany, and Australia, and a tenant is provisioned into one of them, so residency follows the region the buyer picks. Availability carries a 99.9 percent commitment with a service credit behind it. Administration suits an estate run by more than one team, with custom roles scoped to named features, permission sets confining an administrator to part of the estate, and templates and tags that let one policy govern everything carrying the tag.

Identity handling stops at SAML, and that shapes more of the product than it first appears. Okta, Entra ID and AD FS are supported and SAML attributes can drive policy, but there is no SCIM endpoint and no directory synchronization running independently of login, so users are established from the assertion at sign-in and joiner-mover-leaver lifecycle stays with the identity provider. A second, non-corporate identity source cannot be bound alongside the first, so contractors authenticate through the same one, and a grant has no expiry of its own; the ninety-day license reservation is a licensing mechanism rather than a lapsing entitlement. Endpoint operations take a similar shape, with per-platform installers and a real support matrix but no UEM or MDM deployment path. Programmatic administration divides in two: NetCloud API v2 is versioned and broad, covering accounts, users, routers, groups, configurations, logs, and alerts, while ZTNA objects sit on a separate management interface with no public API endpoint and no infrastructure-as-code provider behind it, so policy is authored in the console.

Post-quantum cryptography and AI are where the product is quietest. Encryption is classical throughout, with AES, SHA-2 and Diffie-Hellman groups 14, 19 and 20 on IPsec and AES-256 on the cellular-optimised Microtunnel, and no post-quantum key agreement on either leg. AI sits in the operational plane rather than the access path, as an AIOps dashboard that flags anomalies and the NetCloud Assistant answering natural-language questions, neither producing a policy artifact or a score a rule can test. Every access path resolves to an interactively authenticated person, so there is no service account, workload identity or agent registry to name as a policy subject, and applications are onboarded by hand, one named resource at a time. An organization whose estate is distributed, mobile or industrial, and that already runs Ericsson Cradlepoint hardware, gets a coherent answer here: the router, the service gateway and the clientless portal between them reach assets behind a cellular link, in a vehicle or on a factory floor, with no agent going anywhere near them. Teams driving access policy from a pipeline, needing machine and agent identities alongside human ones, or carrying a post-quantum requirement will want to weigh what is not yet in the access path.


Fortinet

FortiSASE / FortiGate ZTNA

Leader | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Fortinet Universal ZTNA is included rather than sold. The access proxy is a FortiOS feature running on a FortiGate the customer already owns, hardware or virtual, with no separate ZTNA licence. What it does require is FortiClient EMS, which issues device certificates and generates the posture tags the proxy enforces on, and optionally FortiSASE for the cloud-delivered variant. Several of the capabilities credited here depend on further separately licensed products named as dependencies: FortiPAM for credential vaulting and session recording, FortiNAC and the FortiGuard OT Security Service for industrial device identity, and the FortiGate Rugged series for DIN-rail deployment in an industrial zone.

Assessment:

Fortinet’s strength is the endpoint that cannot run a client. The ZTNA web portal brokers RDP, SSH, VNC, SFTP, SMB, and FTP from a browser with stored logon credentials, FortiPAM adds vaulted credentials with keystroke and video recording and approval profiles, and FortiGuard OT Security together with FortiNAC supplies device identity. The Rugged series is certified to IEC 61850-3 and IEEE 1613, which gives the enforcement point a form factor for DIN-rail mounting inside an industrial zone rather than only at the edge of the network. Enforcement elsewhere runs on the same certificate machinery, with client-certificate authentication enabled by default at the access proxy. EMS pushes posture-tag changes over a persistent WebSocket, triggering re-verification of sessions already in progress. As a result, a device that falls out of compliance loses access without waiting for its session to end.

Organizations moving off Fortinet’s own SSL VPN get the most here. The staged cutover set out in the SSL VPN to ZTNA Migration Guide is the most complete in this research. It moves one group at a time, starting with administrators, while leaving SSL VPN running through each phase and applying per-phase disabling and on-net rules. Existing addresses and firewall rules are carried into ZTNA rules, so the estate’s current configuration becomes the starting point for the migration rather than something that must be discarded. Because the proxy is a FortiOS feature with no separate ZTNA licence, that work happens on equipment already bought, which is what makes Fortinet the default for such an estate. FortiSASE extends the same arrangement to the cloud-delivered variant, applying one set of security settings to internet and private traffic through a single decryption, and FortiCloud carries a three-level organization hierarchy with OU-scoped permission profiles for a buyer running distributed sites or tenants.

The connector model is where Fortinet parts company with the rest of this market. The ZTNA access proxy is a virtual IP on the FortiGate itself, so clients connect inbound to a WAN-facing interface. Common deployments therefore require an inbound firewall rule rather than the outbound-registering connector that most of the market has converged on. This architectural choice also limits how far the zero-trust model extends. Onboarding is manual throughout, with EMS catalog entries hand-authored and no discovery record that can be promoted into one, so an estate of any size is catalogued by hand. The AI in the policy path writes configuration from a natural-language request rather than deriving recommendations from observed behaviour. Post-quantum key agreement is generally available across FortiOS but does not reach the ZTNA access-proxy leg.

For an estate that already runs FortiGate, Universal ZTNA arrives as a feature rather than as a purchase, and that one fact explains most of this capsule: the enforcement point is installed, the way off the SSL VPN is mapped phase by phase, and the browser-brokered protocols and rugged hardware reach into places an access agent does not go. The cost is a deployment shape the rest of this market has moved away from. An organization that will not carry an inbound rule on its perimeter, or that wants its access layer to stand apart from its firewall estate, will want to weigh that before committing. Buyers with a large application estate to catalogue may find hand-authored onboarding more limited than they need. Those expecting policy to be derived from behaviour will instead find an assistant that writes configuration on request. Buyers with a post-quantum requirement on the private-access path are also likely to want more than FortiOS currently provides.

Microsoft

Microsoft Entra Private Access

Leader | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Entra Private Access is the ZTNA half of Microsoft Global Secure Access. A deployment needs the Global Secure Access client on Windows, macOS, iOS or Android, and private network connectors on Windows Server that dial outbound on ports 80 and 443 into connector groups. Almost everything that makes the product strong here is a named platform dependency rather than part of the Private Access licence. Conditional Access provides the policy engine, Entra ID Protection handles risk, Entra ID Governance or the Entra Suite provides entitlement management, and Intune supplies device signals. The Entra application proxy provides clientless web publishing, while Defender for Cloud Apps serves as the CASB. Entra Internet Access requires a separate licence.

Assessment:

Microsoft’s strength is that access follows the directory with no second system to keep in step with it. Private application segments are published as Entra enterprise applications with users and groups assigned directly, so a joiner, mover or leaver change takes effect without anyone touching the access product, and entitlement management adds access packages, approval workflows and expiring grants through the Governance SKU. No other product in this research binds provisioning to the directory this closely. The identity signal applies to sessions already in progress as well as new ones. Universal Continuous Access Evaluation responds to events such as account deletion or disablement, password changes or resets, MFA enablement, administrator revocation of all refresh tokens, and high user risk. When one of these events occurs, it issues a claims challenge that interrupts an in-flight Private Access session and blocks its network traffic. Almost nothing else here terminates an established session on an identity event. Policy itself is Conditional Access, with device filter rule expressions, named locations, and sign-in and insider risk, and with the decision function in Entra ID kept distinct from the points that enforce it.

An organization already running Entra gets the most here. Nearly everything that underpins the product is a platform component that a buyer either already owns or can add as a SKU. Conditional Access provides the policy engine, Entra ID Protection supplies risk signals, Intune supplies device signals, the application proxy publishes web applications without a client, and Defender for Cloud Apps acts as the CASB. The compliance work is particularly relevant for regulated and public-sector buyers. NIST SP 800-53 requirements are mapped individually to named Entra capabilities, alongside FedRAMP High and a mapping of Private Access to CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model functions. An organization that does not know what its VPN currently carries can start from discovery, which derives candidate segments from traffic the client observes.

Getting the client onto a fleet is the weakest part of running this. Intune is the only endpoint-management path, each client release has to be repackaged there, and phased rollout is an app-assignment exercise, with no version pinning and no rings, so the fleet moves forward by hand every time the agent changes. Automation stops at a similar edge. The network access resources used to create forwarding profiles, policies, and application segments are available only through the Graph beta endpoint, which Microsoft’s own versioning policy does not support for production use. As a result, an organization managing its access estate as code would be building on an interface that Microsoft does not support for production. The client is also the boundary of what the product reaches, because Private Access requires it and the clientless path belongs to the Entra application proxy rather than to Private Access, which limits how much of an OT or IoT estate can be brought in. Post-quantum key agreement does not reach the private-access path.

What this amounts to is access treated as an extension of the directory, decided in the identity platform and carried out by a network component that follows it. For an organization whose users, devices, governance and risk signals already sit in Entra, this is the shortest distance between a directory and a private application, and the way a session ends on an identity event is ahead of the rest of this research. Operating the client is where that design costs something. Teams that move an agent across a large managed fleet may find repackaging every release in Intune thinner than they need, and an organization that drives its access configuration through an API will want to weigh how much of that runs on an endpoint Microsoft holds unsupported in production. A buyer with an industrial estate to reach, or with a post-quantum requirement on the private-access path, is likely to want more than this offers today.

Portnox

Portnox ZTNA

Challenger | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Portnox ZTNA is a module of Portnox Cloud, sold alongside the company’s NAC, Cloud RADIUS and TACACS+ services in a bundle branded Universal Zero Trust. Its defining architectural decision is that the browser is the client: RDP, SSH, VNC and Telnet sessions render inside the browser through a gateway container, and a third-party client such as PuTTY or a standalone VNC viewer cannot be used. The gateway is a Docker container deployed on Linux, Windows or Azure Container Instances, distributed under a verified-publisher account and registering outbound only. Device posture comes from AgentP, the same endpoint agent the NAC service uses.

Assessment:

Portnox’s strength is the cloud console it inherits from the NAC side of the business. Identity federation selects a provider per resource, with Entra ID, Okta and Google Workspace all covered. AgentP installs through Intune, Configuration Manager, Group Policy, Jamf, Workspace ONE, Kandji and Addigy, and installer switches cover each of them. Directory groups create Portnox accounts on first authentication, and a force-sync carries movers across. A tenant region is chosen at signup between the United States, Europe, and international geo-redundancy and is fixed thereafter. The gateway registers outbound only, so nothing at the customer site listens for an inbound connection, and ISO 27001 and SOC 2 Type II are held under a named auditor, with reports available on request.

A mid-market IT team that already runs Portnox for network access control gets the most here. Wired, wireless and remote access come from one console, posture for a ZTNA session is read by the same AgentP the NAC service uses, and the access module arrives inside the Universal Zero Trust bundle rather than as a separate procurement. Nothing has to be installed on the user side, since RDP, SSH, VNC and Telnet run in the browser, and the only component to stand up is a single Docker container that dials out, on Linux, Windows or Azure Container Instances. That describes a product meant to be turned on rather than operated.

Portnox sells four services, and none of them is a secure web gateway, CASB or DLP, so private-access policy has nothing to converge with and no adjacent inspection service to sit beside. Inside the module the reach is similarly contained. Every resource is defined by hand with an IP address and port, there is no discovery, and destinations cannot be read out of telemetry, so an estate is onboarded one entry at a time. The API’s twenty-two operations cover account, group, MAC and site management on unversioned routes, with no private-access policy objects, registry provider or SDK, which leaves access policy itself beyond programmatic reach. There is no migration procedure or coexistence path for buyers coming off a VPN, so a cutover is planned outside the product. A secure development methodology and a formalized incident response plan sit behind the product, but there is no vulnerability disclosure policy, product-security contact, security.txt or advisory archive for a researcher to report through, and that is the point an enterprise buyer is most likely to raise.

Portnox ZTNA is a browser-first remote-access module inside a cloud network access control service, and it is narrow by design. One console, an agent shared with NAC, a container that dials out, and a browser that needs nothing installed at the far end make remote access something a small IT team can run without adding operational surface. What sits outside that boundary stays outside it, including web and data inspection, application discovery, bulk onboarding and any route to policy other than the console. An organization consolidating private access with web and data controls, onboarding a large application estate, or moving a VPN population across on a plan is likely to need more than a single module inside a network access control service.

SonicWall

SonicWall Cloud Secure Edge

Challenger | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Cloud Secure Edge is the Banyan Security acquisition, now sold and maintained by SonicWall. A deployment is administered from the Cloud Command Center and uses the CSE desktop app on managed endpoints, Connectors that dial out only over outbound HTTPS to the Command Center and outbound UDP for WireGuard tunnels to SonicWall’s Global Edge Network across fifty-plus regions, and Access Tiers as the inbound-facing enforcement proxy. Private resources are offered as hosted websites reachable from any browser, or as infrastructure services covering SSH, RDP, Kubernetes, databases and generic TCP reached through the app with short-lived mutual-TLS certificates.

Assessment:

SonicWall’s strength is a policy layer that keeps the decision apart from the enforcement. The TrustProvider is where a policy is decided, and the Access Tiers and Connectors enforce it; few products here divide the two. Trust is re-evaluated during a session rather than only at connection, drawing device posture from CrowdStrike, SentinelOne and Capture Client, and a drop in trust narrows what a user can reach rather than only ending the session. Conditions span roles, trust level, start and end times, source address, and Layer 4 and Layer 7 rules over CIDRs, protocols, ports and FQDNs, and the Command Center API and the official Terraform provider apply the same objects declaratively, working from an OpenAPI 3.0 specification of ninety-seven operations across two version paths. Identity reaches seven directory types, with SCIM for Okta and Entra ID and several concurrent providers. Every access event records the deciding policy by ID, name, version and enforcement mode, so an administrator asking why a request failed reads the answer instead of reconstructing it. Residency is handled by tethering connectors, clients and egress addresses to selected points of presence, constraining the set the platform may draw from so that data never traverses an out-of-scope region. Availability rests on load-shared, auto-scaling Access Tiers of stateless Netagents, with the optimal point of presence chosen inside that set by geo-proximity DNS, and a public status page carrying incident history.

A mid-market buyer coming off a VPN gets the most here, and the cutover is the reason. Access policies can run in a permissive mode that logs requests they would have denied before moving to enforcement, a capability most products in this research do not offer. Private Resource Discovery, meanwhile, compiles the domains, addresses, ports, users, and devices seen on service tunnels into records that administrators can review. Together, these capabilities allow administrators to discover what is in use and observe the effect of access policies before those policies begin blocking traffic. The Connectors beside the applications dial out only, so the application networks need no inbound exposure of their own, and the product is bought without a commitment to a wider platform, which suits the channel-led purchase SonicWall sells into.

The clientless path is narrower than it looks. Hosted websites open in any browser under an enforcing per-service policy that logs every request. However, that route provides no content controls or clipboard restrictions. The product also provides no native browser-rendered RDP or SSH. To access a server that way, the customer must deploy and operate Apache Guacamole behind a published web interface. Everything else runs through the CSE desktop app. Post-quantum protection does not reach the access path, and OT coverage stops at structured protocols and databases published through a connector, while convergence, AI automation and agentic access each have something to assess. The AI capabilities focus on reporting rather than policy. They include AI-generated summaries of system logs and events and an AI-assisted administrative search built on a large language model, but they do not generate policy objects. Trust scoring remains a deterministic calculation based on administrator-selected Trust Factors.

SonicWall Cloud Secure Edge is built on the Banyan Security product acquired by SonicWall, and much of its original engineering approach remains intact. The platform explicitly separates policy decisions from enforcement, provides a declarative interface across the object model, and supports a VPN cutover that can be logged before enforcement begins. The limitations become clearer in the browser. Organizations that need to govern unmanaged or third-party devices within the session, rather than simply control whether they are admitted, may find the browser-based path more limited than they need. Buyers with significant OT requirements or a need for post-quantum key agreement are also likely to want more than the platform currently offers.

Twingate

Twingate

Challenger | Agile Optimizers | Fast Following

Summary:

Twingate sells a single product designed as a VPN replacement, built around a client installed on every device. There is no browser-based path to a protected resource. Connectors can be deployed as a Linux systemd package or an OCI container across AWS, GCP, and Azure. Twingate also provides a Kubernetes Helm chart and Operator, with a minimum of two connectors required per Remote Network. Twingate-hosted Relays sit between client and connector, and a Controller makes decisions without ever entering the data path. Headless clients and Service Keys extend the same model to CI/CD and server workloads.

Assessment:

Twingate’s strength is the machinery an engineering team touches. Failover is built into the deployment shape, with a minimum of two connectors per remote network, automatic client failover between them, relay clusters across regions, and a public status page carrying incident history. Provisioning is as complete, combining SCIM 2.0 user and group endpoints across six directories with ephemeral access, where a group-to-resource grant expires on a window set anywhere between one hour and one year, and just-in-time requests reviewed by an admin or an access reviewer and expiring by themselves afterwards. Policy layers device posture requirements, trusted profiles, country restrictions, MFA and authentication-frequency controls with AND logic, so a rule accumulates its conditions rather than choosing among them.

Engineering-led teams get the most here, because the product is built the way they already work. The object model is applied declaratively through a GraphQL admin API and a Terraform provider, so an access rule lives in the same repository as the infrastructure it fronts. The container story is among the most complete in this research, covering a Helm chart, an Operator, outbound-only networking that leaves no inbound port to open, and ICMP alongside TCP and UDP on any port. Headless clients and Service Keys give a CI/CD job or a server workload the same treatment as a person, and the Controller stays out of the data path, so the decision plane is not sitting between a user and an application. What such a team is not asked to take on is a security platform around the access product, which Twingate has not built.

Three of the limits are scope decisions rather than shortfalls. A user cannot reach a protected resource without authenticating through the Client, so there is no clientless mode, and that settles non-standard and OT endpoint coverage and universal ZTNA for OT and IoT along with it, since anything that cannot run the Client is out of reach. The cryptography is specified on every leg and is classical, with no post-quantum roadmap. No AI or machine learning appears in the policy path, and Twingate claims none either, which is rarer here than the capability itself. Two further limits weigh more on enterprise procurement than on the engineering buyer. Compliance coverage stops at per-framework material for SOC 2, HIPAA, PCI DSS, GDPR and DORA, with no certificate number, audit scope or independent registry entry behind it. Supply chain assurance runs to a responsible-disclosure policy and signed Linux packages, with no advisory archive, CVE record, bounty programme or SBOM. Administration offers five fixed roles with no scoping construct, no custom roles and no tenant hierarchy, so an organization that needs its estate divided between teams divides it into separate accounts or not at all.

The edge is hard, and it is drawn deliberately. This is an access product doing a narrow job to a standard little here matches, and declining the rest of the brief. The client-only path, the classical cryptography and the empty policy-automation story are choices rather than oversights, and a team that wants access held in Terraform beside everything else will read them that way. An organization needing browser-only access for contractors, OT hosts inside the same policy, administration delegated across business units, or certification detail behind the frameworks the product names, might need to consider something built for a wider brief.

5.
Velocity

5. Velocity

Market-Level Velocity Story

Velocity on this Radar measures market momentum: the pace at which a vendor is shipping capability that moves the category, judged against the market’s direction of travel rather than feature count. It is rendered on the chart as the color of each vendor’s dot—Outpacing, Fast Following, or Slow Following—never as an arrow. Of the 32 pairs assessed, five earn Outpacing, twenty-five are Fast Following, and two are Slow Following. At 16% of the field, the Outpacing band sits inside the discipline this methodology imposes: the designation requires shipped, category-moving evidence, not general corporate health.

What the Outpacing five share is position on the market’s leading edges. Four of the five are converged platforms, and the group holds the field’s most complete shipped answers to the questions the rest of the roster is still reaching for: generally available post-quantum key agreement on both access legs, first-class non-human principals and registries for agentic workloads, inline inspection of agent traffic, discovery pipelines that promote observed traffic into governed application segments with explicit approval, and identity-event machinery that terminates established sessions when risk changes. The sixth is the deliberate architectural pure-play, whose momentum shows in the steady deepening of the access architecture itself—scriptable policy extensibility, event-driven risk evaluation, and an infrastructure-as-code surface that outbuilds vendors many times its size. Each of the six shipped something in the evidence window that the rest of the field now has to answer.

Fast Following is the market’s healthy center, and at twenty-five vendors it is where most of this roster lives. The label is not a consolation prize: this band contains vendors that lead the field outright on individual criteria—industrial coverage, clientless session governance, migration tooling, multi-tenant hierarchy, diagnostics that show the operator the reasoning rather than the result—and several of the field’s most distinctive architectures. Their shipping pace tracks the market’s direction without setting it on the emerging fronts where the Outpacing group is defining what comes next.

Slow Following, under this methodology, is never a euphemism for missing data; it requires affirmative trailing evidence. The pattern among the three is concrete: programmatic surfaces that have not grown to cover the access objects, access paths still gated at connection time rather than continuously evaluated, heritage integration endpoints frozen at a predecessor product’s specification, emerging-technology criteria resting at the floor across the set, and in one case a public technical record too thin to verify the product’s claims. For buyers, a trailing mark is a diligence instruction—verify the roadmap, the documentation currency, and the SKU’s standing inside its own portfolio—not a verdict on whether the installed product works today.

6.
Ecosystem

6. Ecosystem

Technical Support Quality and Responsiveness

Availability commitments are now a genuine differentiator in this field’s public record. The strongest platforms publish 99.999% commitments with graduated credit tables, per-service or per-point-of-presence status pages with retained incident histories, and in the best cases a dated public advisory record that lets a buyer audit the vendor’s operational candor. The other end of the field is starkly different: one commitment sits below the threshold this research credits, at least one major vendor publishes no availability commitment for its security services at all, and several smaller vendors publish neither a commitment nor a status page. Redundancy documentation follows the same split — from quorum arithmetic and explicit failure-tolerance tables to a recommended backup instance with no failure detection described. Buyers should treat support and availability terms as a negotiation item and require recovery behavior in writing wherever the public record is silent.

Professional Services Depth

Formal professional-services practices are largely undocumented in this field’s public materials; what the capsules evidence instead is migration machinery, and it is some of the best tooling in the market. The strongest implementations pair discovery — mining live VPN or tunnel traffic into reviewable application candidates with user counts — with staged-cutover guides that move one group at a time while the legacy VPN keeps running, log-only enforcement modes that show what would have been denied before anything is, and bulk import paths for applications and grants. At the other end, migration is undocumented entirely: no procedure, no coexistence guidance, and hand-authored applications one console action at a time. Organizations with large estates should size the migration workload against the tooling evidence in each capsule, and treat the managed-service channel — which several vendors serve with dedicated portals — as the effective services arm for the mid-market.

Partner and Channel Ecosystem Breadth

The managed-service channel is well built out across the operational quadrants: named MSP portals spanning customer tenants, genuine parent-child tenant hierarchies with inherited configuration and per-tenant administrator credentials, tenant lifecycle automation through published APIs, and cross-tenant usage and billing reporting all appear in the field’s documentation. Cloud marketplace presence is broad—connector and gateway images across the major clouds recur throughout the roster—and technology alliances cluster at three integration points: identity providers, where multi-IdP and SCIM coverage is the front of the field; endpoint detection and posture, where third-party risk scores feed access conditions and one platform names more than thirty risk providers; and SIEM platforms, where published log schemas and streaming export separate auditable products from opaque ones.

Workforce Skills Availability

Skills transfer in this market runs along the infrastructure-as-code seam. Containers, orchestration charts, and declarative providers recur across the field’s connector architectures, so platform and DevOps teams bring existing practice directly to the access estate; several products are operable entirely through the same pipelines that manage the rest of the infrastructure. Open protocol and open-source foundations at the fabric layer of some products let buyers inspect and hire against public technology. Where products are identity-led, the scarce skill is identity engineering rather than networking; where they are appliance-led, existing firewall and VPN operational skills carry over almost unchanged—which is precisely the appeal of those products to their installed bases. The counterweight is the console-only tail of the field, where no programmatic surface exists and operational knowledge remains product-specific by construction.

Training and Certification Programs

Formal, named certification paths for the access products themselves are rare in this field’s public record; the large platform vendors fold ZTNA modules into their existing certification ladders, and the specialists publish administrator documentation rather than curricula. What the field does ship is deployment enablement: per-UEM installation guides across the major device-management platforms, silent-install references, staged rollout guidance, and user-facing diagnostic tools that reduce the support burden a rollout generates. Documentation currency and completeness vary more than any curriculum could compensate for—the strongest estates are complete, public, and versioned, while others are login-gated or partially stale. Buyers planning large rollouts should request training catalogs directly and weight the public documentation estate heavily: for most of this field, it is the training program.

Community Health

Community health in this market tracks documentation transparency, and the assessment repeatedly found that opacity, not absence, was the binding constraint on what could be verified. The healthiest ecosystems publish their architecture to be checked: security target documents under formal evaluation schemes, reference builds with standards bodies, published threat-model and data-flow papers, open protocol specifications, and complete public documentation portals a practitioner can read before ever engaging sales. The other end is gated: support portals behind sign-in walls, admin documentation unreachable in public, trust pages that resolve to placeholders, and attestations asserted on marketing pages without a certificate, scope, or request path behind them. Two vendors in this evaluation could not be substantially verified from public material at all—a fact the scoring records explicitly. Prospective buyers should treat the public record itself as a diligence signal: a vendor that cannot be verified before contact will be harder to audit after purchase.

7.
Architect’s Validation

7. Architect’s Validation

No organization weights all 28 criteria in this evaluation equally. The placements in this report reflect the market’s center of gravity, not your architecture. The table below indicates when to promote specific criteria to first-order requirements and when to let them recede.

Prioritize when…

Treat as secondary when…

Zero Trust Architecture Integrity — the access product is your control plane for lateral-movement risk, and you need decision and enforcement separated, unauthenticated surfaces closed, and a published threat model an auditor can check

Your deployment is a bounded VPN replacement inside a defense-in-depth estate, and platform certifications satisfy your assurance bar

Continuous Session Risk Evaluation — compromised-credential and mid-session risk are in your threat model, and an established session must not outlive the conditions that authorized it

Sessions are short, applications are low-sensitivity, and login-time posture with periodic re-authentication covers your exposure window

Clientless Access Architecture and Third-Party Governance — contractors, auditors, BYOD, or acquisitions put unmanaged devices in front of private applications every week

Every user who touches private applications works on a managed device your agent already reaches

Automation and Orchestration API — the estate is hundreds of applications and thousands of grants, operated by a team that manages infrastructure as code

The application count is small, changes are rare, and console administration is genuinely sufficient

Data Residency and Sovereignty Controls — jurisdiction, works-council expectations, or sector regulation constrain where sessions terminate and logs live

You are a single-jurisdiction organization whose regulators accept major-cloud hosting with standard contractual terms

OT and Non-Standard Endpoint Coverage — plant floors, medical devices, or field equipment must be reached and governed by the same access fabric

The estate is entirely conventional IT endpoints, and industrial access is handled by a dedicated system elsewhere

Quantum-Resistant Cryptography — long-retention regulated data traverses the access path and harvest-now-decrypt-later is a stated concern of your regulator or your board

Your data’s confidentiality horizon is short, and crypto-agility evidence — named algorithms, rotation discipline — satisfies the diligence question today

Adapting the Radar to Your Organization. Start from your three or four non-negotiable criteria and re-read the vendor capsules against those alone. Let that reading reorder the field before you consider overall placement. A vendor positioned modestly on this Radar may be the outright leader for your weighting, and the reverse is equally true.

8.
Horizon

8. Horizon

Capabilities Likely to Become Table Stakes (12–24 Months)

Several capabilities that still separate vendors today are on a clear path to assumption within 12 to 24 months. The outbound-only connector delivered as a container image with orchestration support is nearly there already—the field’s strongest implementations publish it across every major form factor, and inbound-facing deviations now read as findings. Multi-IdP support with SCIM provisioning is close behind, as is the published status page with retained incident history. Discovery-driven onboarding — mining observed traffic into reviewable application candidates rather than hand-authoring FQDN objects—is spreading fast enough that manual-only onboarding will shortly be a disqualifier at enterprise scale. Browser-rendered RDP and SSH with at least clipboard and download controls is becoming the expected floor for the contractor population, and infrastructure-as-code coverage of the core access objects—applications, connectors, policies, groups—is moving from differentiator to procurement checkbox among engineering-led buyers. Posture re-evaluation that responds to change mid-session, rather than at the next login, is the quiet one: the vendors that still gate only at connection time are now a visible minority, and buyers have begun to ask the trigger-list question unprompted.

Capabilities Likely to Emerge as Differentiators

The next cycle’s separation is already legible in this cycle’s weakest criteria. Post-quantum key agreement on the access path itself has its first shipped implementations, and the gap between vendors that publish post-quantum material for other products and vendors that ship it on the private-access legs will become a standing diligence question long before it becomes common. Agentic workload identity is the widest-open front: agent registries, scoped and expiring non-human credentials, workload identity federation, and governed agent-to-tool traffic exist in shipped form at only a few vendors, and every enterprise AI initiative that touches private applications will force the question. AI-driven policy automation will differentiate on the enforcement loop, not the assistant—a vendor-computed risk score that policy can act on, and recommendations that become reviewable policy objects, against natural-language summaries that produce nothing enforceable. Identity-event session termination—consuming disablement, credential-reset, and risk signals and interrupting established sessions on them—remains rare enough to decide evaluations. And the deepening industrial stories, with protocol-level control and purpose-built form factors, will separate the universal-access claims from the remote-worker products that borrowed the language.

Expected Market Consolidation or Fragmentation

This roster is itself a consolidation record. Several of its products are acquisitions rebuilt onto their acquirers’ platforms, others are cloud-managed successors to VPN-era product lines, one platform’s lineage runs through two prior corporate identities, and one vendor’s convergence story now depends on a partnership because its own sibling service was retired. The absorption pressure is structural: SSE and SASE platforms treat private access as an attachable module, the identity layer treats it as an extension of conditional access, and the standalone half of the field is already the smaller half. Expect both motions to continue—platform vendors acquiring for architecture and installed base, and the deliberately narrow specialists either growing their enterprise scaffolding fast enough to stay independent or becoming the next module. For buyers, the costs of consolidation are observable in this report’s capsules rather than hypothetical: documentation still hosted on predecessor domains, capabilities that ship first in a sibling SKU, APIs frozen at the acquired product’s specification, and packaging that changes around an unchanged engine. An ownership change is not a defect—some of the strongest platform inheritance here comes from exactly these events—but it should trigger explicit diligence on documentation currency, module boundaries, and the roadmap standing of the specific SKU you are buying.

9.
Value Chain

9. Value Chain

Zero trust network access sits in the middle of an identity-to-application value chain. It consumes identity, device, and risk context from systems the organization already runs, refines them into per-session access decisions and governed connectivity, and feeds the platforms where security operations, automation, and audit happen. No product in this report operates alone, and much of the differentiation lives at the two seams.

Upstream inputs

The ZTNA platform

Downstream consumers

Identity providers via SAML/OIDC federation and SCIM provisioning; directory estates; device management and EDR platforms supplying posture and risk signals; external risk feeds and shared-signal frameworks; certificate and workload-identity infrastructure

Brokered, per-application sessions; the policy decision point and its enforcement fabric; outbound-dialing connectors beside applications; endpoint clients and clientless browser delivery; continuous posture and risk re-evaluation; discovery and migration tooling; inspection and data controls on private traffic

SIEM platforms consuming published log schemas in near real time; SOAR and infrastructure-as-code pipelines driving policy through APIs and providers; private applications, industrial assets, and agentic workloads receiving governed connectivity; audit and compliance reporting; managed-service consoles operating tenant estates

In the identity stack, ZTNA is the enforcement layer for everything federation alone cannot govern: the identity provider decides who the user is, and the access fabric decides what that identity may reach right now, from this device, in this posture. The strongest integrations make those two layers one system—directory groups driving entitlements, identity events interrupting live sessions, deprovisioning that revokes reachability rather than only login. The boundary with the network stack is under equal pressure from the other side: SD-WAN, firewall, and SSE portfolios all claim the same connective tissue, and buyers should decide deliberately whether they are purchasing an access product, a platform module, or the platform itself.

On lifecycle timing, buy or replace when the estate changes shape: a VPN refresh or end-of-life, an identity-platform migration, a merger that doubles the contractor population, a cloud or OT expansion the current perimeter cannot follow, or an AI-automation program that needs governed non-human access. Two choices are the durable ones and deserve the decade view: the connector and brokerage architecture, which determines your exposure model, and the policy engine, which accumulates your organization’s access logic. Clients, consoles, and even the inspection stack around them are more replaceable than they appear; the migration tooling documented across this field is genuinely good, and the capsules note where it is not.

10.
Appendix A: Decision Criteria

10. Appendix A: Decision Criteria

The evaluation used 28 analyst-authored decision criteria with 0–5 scoring rubrics, grouped by lens. Scores of record for each vendor–product pair were assessed against these rubrics on published, verifiable evidence, then adjusted through fact-check adjudication where vendor-submitted evidence demonstrably satisfied a rubric’s requirements.

Green Money (Innovation & Growth)

  • Automation and Orchestration API

  • Single Packet Authorization

  • SSE/SASE Platform Integration

  • Application Discovery and Onboarding

  • Clientless Access Architecture

  • Policy Engine Architecture

  • Connector and Relay Architecture

Brown Money (Operations & Efficiency)

  • Session Reliability and Failover

  • Identity Provider Integration Depth

  • Endpoint Agent Manageability

  • Access Troubleshooting and Diagnostics

  • OT and Non-Standard Endpoint Coverage

  • Multi-Tenant and Distributed Org Management

  • VPN Migration Tooling

  • Access Provisioning Automation Depth

GRCS (Governance, Risk, Compliance & Security)

  • Service Resilience and Availability

  • Third-Party and Contractor Access Governance

  • Zero Trust Architecture Integrity

  • Data Residency and Sovereignty Controls

  • Supply Chain and Infrastructure Security

  • Continuous Session Risk Evaluation

  • Access Audit Trail and Forensics

  • Regulatory Compliance Mapping

Emerging Technology

  • Unified ZTNA and SSE Convergence

  • Quantum-Resistant Cryptography

  • Universal ZTNA for OT/IoT

  • AI-Driven Policy Automation

  • ZTNA for Agentic AI Workloads

11.
Methodology

11. Methodology

*Vendors marked with an asterisk did not participate in our research process for the Radar report, and their capsules and scoring were compiled via desk research.

For more information about our research process for Radar reports, please visit our Methodology.

12.
About Chris Ray

12. About Chris Ray

Chris Ray is a veteran of the cyber security domain. He has a collection of experiences ranging from small teams to large financial institutions. Additionally, Chris has worked in healthcare, manufacturing, and tech. More recently, he has acquired an extensive amount of experience advising and consulting with security vendors, helping them find product-market fit as well as deliver cyber security services.

13.
About GigaOm

13. About GigaOm

GigaOm provides technical, operational, and business advice for IT’s strategic digital enterprise and business initiatives. Enterprise business leaders, CIOs, and technology organizations partner with GigaOm for practical, actionable, strategic, and visionary advice for modernizing and transforming their business. GigaOm’s advice empowers enterprises to successfully compete in an increasingly complicated business atmosphere that requires a solid understanding of constantly changing customer demands.

GigaOm works directly with enterprises both inside and outside of the IT organization to apply proven research and methodologies designed to avoid pitfalls and roadblocks while balancing risk and innovation. Research methodologies include but are not limited to adoption and benchmarking surveys, use cases, interviews, ROI/TCO, market landscapes, strategic trends, and technical benchmarks. Our analysts possess 20+ years of experience advising a spectrum of clients from early adopters to mainstream enterprises.

GigaOm’s perspective is that of the unbiased enterprise practitioner. Through this perspective, GigaOm connects with engaged and loyal subscribers on a deep and meaningful level.